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Abstract
This paper provides a general analysis of comparative statics results in global games.
I show that the e¤ect of a change in any parameter of the global game model can be
decomposed into the direct e¤ect, which captures the e¤ect of a change in parameters
when agentsbeliefs are held constant, and the multiplier e¤ect, which captures the role of
adjustments in agentsbeliefs. I characterize conditions under which the multiplier e¤ect
is strong and relate it to the strength of strategic complementarities and the publicity
multiplier emphasized in earlier work. Finally, I use the above insights to identify when
comparative statics can be deduced from the models primitives, when they do not depend
on the information structure, and when they coincide with predictions of the complete
information model.
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1 Introduction
Global games are coordination games with incomplete information where agents payo¤s
depend on whether the status quo is preserved or abandoned. This class of games was rst
introduced to the literature by Carlsson and Damme (1993) and popularized by Morris and
Shin (1998, 2003). Since then, global games have been fruitfully used to study economic
phenomena that feature coordination motives such as currency crises, sovereign debt crises,
bank runs, business cycle uctuations, or political revolts, among others.1
The popularity of global games stems from the fact that, in contrast to coordination
games with complete information, global games tend to have a unique equilibrium. This
uniqueness of equilibrium allows one to obtain unambiguous comparative statics results and
policy prescriptions. Indeed, in applications of global games a signicant e¤ort is typically
devoted to establishing comparative statics results. However, these results are derived on
a case-by-case basis, and there exist few general results that could be invoked to simplify
such analysis. Furthermore, there have been few attempts to understand how the presence of
incomplete information structure and heterogeneous beliefs a¤ect comparative statics results.
The goal of this paper is to ll in this gap in the literature. In particular, I focus on the
following questions: What is the role of heterogeneous beliefs and the information structure
in determining comparative statics results? When are the beliefs important drivers of com-
parative statics results? How di¤erent, qualitatively and quantitatively, are predictions of
global games than predictions derived from the underlying complete information models?2
To answer the above questions, I consider a general global game model. Using standard tech-
niques, I compute the unique equilibrium of the model, which, as usual, is characterized by a
regime change threshold  (i.e., the value of fundamentals below which the status quo col-
lapses and above which the status quo prevails). I then turn my attention to the comparative
statics analysis of the regime change threshold, which is the focus of the paper.
The main result of the paper, which all other results in the paper build on, is that
the change in the threshold , following a change in any parameter of the model, can be
decomposed into a product of a direct e¤ect and a multiplier e¤ect. The direct e¤ect
captures how a change in a parameter of the model a¤ects the regime change threshold when
agentsbeliefs are held constant. Thus, the direct e¤ect captures the fundamental (i.e., non-
1For example, currency crises have been considered in Morris and Shin (1998), Hellwig, Mukherji, and
Tsyvinski (2006), Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006, 2007); debt crises have been addressed in Szkup
(2017) and Zabai (2014); political revolts have been treated in Edmond (2013); and business cycles have been
delt with in Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2016). For applications to banking and the design of banking
regulation, see Eisenbach (2016), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Rochet and Vives (2004), or Vives (2014).
2With every global game model, we can associate a complete information model which is identical to the
global game model but where agents observe the underlying fundamentals.
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belief) channels through which a change in a parameter of the model a¤ects the equilibrium.
The multiplier e¤ect, on the other hand, captures the e¤ect of the adjustment in agents
beliefs about the likelihood of a regime change. I show that the multiplier e¤ect is always
greater than 1, and the same for each parameter of the model.
The above decomposition of comparative statics has three immediate consequences. First,
it indicates that in order to determine whether a given change in a policy parameter decreases
the likelihood of regime change, one can focus on the direct e¤ect and abstract from adjust-
ments in beliefs (i.e., hold beliefs constant). Second, it indicates that adjustments in beliefs
act like an amplication mechanism that always magnies the initial e¤ect of the parameter
change. Third, since the multiplier e¤ect associated with a change in each parameter is the
same, to identify which parameters have the strongest e¤ect on the equilibrium it su¢ ces
to compare their direct e¤ects. Thus, the above decomposition not only claries the role of
beliefs in the model but also can be used to simplify comparative statics analysis.
In the remainder of the paper, I further investigate the properties of the multiplier and di-
rect e¤ects. I rst relate the multiplier e¤ect to the publicity multiplierand to the strength
of strategic complementarities in the model. Morris and Shin (2003, 2004) showed that the
impact of public information on the agents equilibrium threshold signals is stronger than
justied by its information content, and referred to this e¤ect as the publicity multiplier.
I show that the publicity multiplier is a special case of the multiplier e¤ect identied above,
and that a similar e¤ect is associated with other parameters of the model. I also nd that
the multiplier e¤ect is large precisely when best-response functions are steep at the equi-
librium threshold.3 I then use this observation to characterize when the multiplier e¤ect is
strong, which allows me to identify conditions when a small shock to the model can have
large equilibrium consequences.
Next, I turn my attention to the direct e¤ect. Since the direct e¤ect determines the
sign of comparative statics results, I use it to answer three related questions: (1) When
can the comparative statics results be deduced from the models primitives?, (2) When are
comparative statics results independent of the assumed information structure? (3) When
do predictions of the global game model coincide with predictions based on analysis of the
extremal equilibria of the complete information model? I provide a simple condition on the
models primitives under which comparative statics results can be deduced without solving the
model and under which they are robust to changes in the information structure. I also provide
two examples where this condition is violated and show that in such a case the information
structure may a¤ect the results. Finally, I provide conditions under which predictions of the
3This result identies the relevant measure of strategic complementarities for comparative statics analysis
of global games. The importance of accounting for the strength of strategic complementarities in global games
when performing comparative statics analysis has recently been emphasized by Vives (2014).
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global game model and the underlying complete information model coincide.
Throughout the paper, I show how the results established herein can be used to derive
new results, improve understanding of the existing results, or extend existing results.
Related Literature  This paper contributes to the ever-growing literature on global
games. Global games were introduced by Carlsson and Damme (1993), and extended by
Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) and Oury (2013).4 While global games have been ex-
tensively studied, there have been few attempts to derive general comparative statics results
for global games or to understand the role that heterogeneous beliefs play in those results.
The notable exceptions are Iachan and Nenov (2015), who study the e¤ects of changes in
the precision in private information quality on the regime change threshold, and Guimaraes
and Morris (2007), who compare the predictions of global game model with those of a com-
plete information framework in a context of a currency crisis model. Similar, to Iachan and
Nenov (2015), I consider a general global game model, but do not limit myself to changes in
information structure.
The analysis in the paper builds on insights from Cooper and John (1988) and Vives
(2014). Cooper and John (1988) were the rst to emphasize that models with strategic
complementarities tend to feature a multiplier e¤ect, although their analysis was limited to a
complete information framework. Vives (2014) stresses the importance of taking into account
the strength of strategic complementarities when performing comparative statics analysis in
global games. The direct motivation for this work, however, comes from the applied literature
and the di¢ culty of deriving (and interpreting) comparative statics results in complex global
game models such as those in Eisenbach (2016), Szkup (2017), or Zabai (2014). Indeed, in
Szkup (2017) I apply the results presented in this paper to analyze the e¤ects of various
government policies aimed at preventing self-fullling debt crises.5
From a broader perspective, this paper is also related to the work on monotone compara-
tive statics and supermodular games (see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Topkis,
1998; Van Zandt and Vives, 2007; Vives, 1990; and Vives, 2004). One of the goals of these
papers is to characterize a condition where a change in a parameter leads to a monotone
adjustment either in the agents choice (in a single-agent decision problem) or in the agents
4See also Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007), Mathevet and Steiner (2013), and Steiner (2008) for
analysis of dynamic global games; Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), Angeletos and Werning (2006),
Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), and Tarashev (2007) for analysis of the impact of exogenous and
endogenous public information on the global games equilibrium; Dasgupta (2007) for analysis of an option
to delay decisions; Szkup and Trevino (2015) for the analysis of information acquisition; Angeletos, Hellwig,
and Pavan (2006) and Angeletos and Pavan (2013) for analysis of signalling; or Edmond (2013) for analysis
of information manipulation.
5While the model in Szkup (2017) does not t directly into the framework considered in this paper I show
there that similar results can be extended to a more complicated micro-founded environment.
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best-response function (in strategic environments). These papers are also helpful in the analy-
sis of global games, however, by relying on specic properties of global games, I am able to
derive more detailed results and to uncover properties that are related to the structure of
global games in particular.
2 The Model
In this section, I describe the general model within which I perform my analysis. In Section
2.2 I provide several well-known examples that t my setup. I also briey characterize the
unique equilibrium of the model, which will serve as the starting point for the comparative
statics analysis performed in the remainder of the paper.
2.1 Setup
There is a continuum of players indexed by i, i 2 I; where without loss of generality I is
normalized to [0; 1]. The set of players I is partitioned into a nite set S of types of players,
S= fs1; :::; sNg. For every n 2 f1; :::; Ng, sn contains a continuum of identical players of
measure n, with Nn=1n = 1. The type of player i is denoted by s (i). All agents, regardless
of their type, have the same action set A = f0; 1g and choose ai 2 f0; 1g, where ai = 1
corresponds to attacking the regime and ai = 0 corresponds to not attacking the regime (i.e.,
supporting the status quo).6 Let m = Nn=1
R
i2sn aidi

denote the proportion of agents
choosing to attack the status quo.
The economy is characterized by a state variable  2 R, referred to as the strength of the
regime, and by the regime status R2 f0; 1g, where R = 1 denotes a change of the regime
while R = 0 means that the status quo is preserved. Initially, the economy is in the status
quo. The regime changes, that is, R = 1, if and only if
R (;m; ) < 0,
where  is a vector that contains all the parameters of the model.7,8 The function R mea-
sures the resilience of the regime and is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable in all its
arguments, with R1 > 0 and R2 < 0. That is, the resilience of the regime increases with
6 I focus on binary global games since not only such games are more tractable but also because most of the
literature focused on such games. It is also worth pointing out that the main results can be extended to the
case of continuum of actions, but at the cost of substantially complicating the analysis.
7For example, in Morris and Shin (1998) the status quo is a currency peg, while the alternative regime is
oating exchange rate regime; in Dasgupta (2007) the status quo is unprotable (or unsuccessful) investment,
while the alternative regime is the state where investment is protable (successful); in Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005) the status quo is a bank being solvent, while the alternative state is the bank becoming insolvent, etc.
8 I provide specic examples of the vector  in Section 2.2.
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, the intrinsic strength of the regime, and decreases with m, the proportion of agents that
decide to challenge the status quo. Finally, I assume that for su¢ ciently low enough  the
regime will change even if no agent attacks it, while for su¢ ciently high  the regime will
survive even if all agents decide to challenge it. In other words, there exist  and  such that
R (; 0; ) = 0 and R
 
; 1; 

= 0,
and the regime collapses for all  <  while it survives for all  >  irrespective of the
proportion of the agents that decides to attack it.9
The types of players di¤er in respect to their payo¤ functions. Since the action space is
binary, when making their decisions, agents care only about the di¤erential payo¤ between
attacking the status quo and not attacking it. Thus, it is enough to specify the payo¤
di¤erential functions rather than the payo¤ functions themselves. Let n (;m; ) denote the
payo¤ gain from choosing ai = 1 rather than ai = 0 for an agent of type sn (the superscript
on the function  denotes the type of the agent). Then
n (;m; ) =
(
Hn (; ) if R = 1
Ln (; ) if R = 0
,
where Hn (; ) > 0 is the payo¤ di¤erential between attacking the status quo and not
attacking it for an agent of type sn when the regime changes and Ln (; ) < 0 is the
corresponding when the status quo is preserved. For every n 2 f1; :::; Ng, Hn and Ln are
di¤erentiable in all their arguments, bounded, and non-increasing in .
The strength of the regime, , is distributed uniformly over the real line and is initially
unobserved.10 Agent i observes a private signal
xi =  + 
 1=2
s(i) "i,
where "i is distributed according to an absolutely continuous distribution Fs(i) with mean 0
and continuously di¤erentiable density fs(i). The "i are identically distributed across agents
of the same type, independent across all agents, and independent of . The parameter  s(i)
measures the precision of agent is signal, with a higher  s(i) implying a more precise signal.
Note that all agents of the same type observe identically distributed signals with the same
precision. However, the distribution of the signals and their precisions may vary across types.
As stated above,  = f 1; :::;  Mg2 RM is the vector of all the parameters of the model,
with  m denoting a specic parameter. The vector  includes both the parameters of the
9Following the literature, I refer to

; 

as the coordination region.
10The assumption of a uniform improper prior is made for simplicity. Nevertheless, in Sections 4:1 and
5:2 I consider a model with a proper prior (though in those cases I limit myself to the Gaussian information
structure).
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information structure as well as parameters that directly a¤ect the regime change function
R, or the payo¤ di¤erential functions Hn and Ln, n = 1; :::; N . Examples of this vector are
given in the next section, in the context of specic global game models used in earlier papers.
2.2 Examples
The environment described above is general and encompasses a large number of models used
in the applied global game literature. Below I show how several well-known models map into
the setup described above. Later, I will use these particular models to illustrate applications
of the results developed in the paper.
2.2.1 Morris and Shin (1998)
In their pioneering work, Morris and Shin (1998) used global games to study self-fullling
currency crises. In their setup, there is a continuum of ex-ante identical speculators, indexed
by i with i 2 [0; 1], who are deciding whether to attack a currency peg. The payo¤ from
attacking the peg is e   s ()  t if the peg collapses following the attack, and  t if the peg
survives. Here, t captures a transaction cost associated with attacking the currency, e is the
prevailing exchange rate (at which the currency is xed), and s () is the shadow exchange
rate (i.e., the exchange rate that would materialize if the currency were allowed to oat).
Finally,  captures the strength of the fundamentals, so that a higher  is associated with
a higher shadow exchange rate (i.e., s0 () > 0). The speculators do not observe  but only
noisy signals xi =  + "i, "i  F , with zero mean, and with "i that are i:i:d: across agents
and independent of . The currency peg is maintained by a central bank with an objective
function v   c (;m), where m is the proportion of speculators that attack the currency; v
captures the benet of maintaining the currency peg, while c (;m) is the cost of defending
the peg, with c < 0 and cm > 0.
The model described above ts into the framework of Section 2:1. To see this, let
 = (v; e; t; ) be the vector of the parameters of the model, assume that there is a sin-
gle type of agent (or speculator), and set
R (;m; ) = v   c (;m) , H (; ) = e   s ()  t, and L (; ) =  t
2.2.2 Sakovics and Steiner (2012)
Sakovics and Steiner (2012) ask who should be subsidized in an investment game with strate-
gic complementarities in order to maximize the probability of successful investment. They
model the investment game as a global game.
In their setup, there is a continuum of investors divided into N groups, where n is the
measure of agents in group n, n = 1; :::; N , with Nn=1n = 1. Investors simply choose
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whether to invest or not. For an investor that belongs to group n, the cost of investment
is cn. If he invests and the investment is successful, then he earns a benet b; otherwise his
benet is 0. The other option is to refrain from investing, with a return of 0. The investment
is successful if and only if enough agents invest, that is, if
m  1  ,
where m is the total mass of agents that invest. Agents do not observe , but each agent in
group n observes a private signal xi = +  1=2"i, where "i  Fn (so that agents in di¤erent
groups have di¤erent signal distributions), with 0 mean.
Again, it is easy to see that this setup ts into the general setup described in Section 2.1.
Dene b  1  , let  = fb1; c1; :::; bN ; cN ; g, and set
R (;m; ) = b  m, Hn = bn   cn, and Ln =  cn
Here, I redene the state of the economy as b  1   so that R is increasing in the state of
the economy, as was assumed in Section 2:1.
2.2.3 Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011)
Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) use global games to model ine¢ cient credit market freezes and
to investigate policies that could prevent such undesirable outcomes. In their model, there
is a continuum [0; 1] of risk-neutral banks, each with a net worth of $1, and which decide
whether to invest in a risk-free asset or provide a loan to non-nancial corporations. The
return on the risk-free investment is equal to 1 + r. The return on a corporate loan is equal
to 1 + R (with R > r) if the economic fundamentals are strong and a su¢ cient number of
corporations obtain credit, and 0 otherwise. In particular, a corporate loan pays net return
R if and only if  + zm > b, where  captures the strength of the economy, m is the mass of
rms that received funding from the banks, z captures the strength of aggregate investment
complementarities in the economy, and b is a threshold level for the loans to be protable. As
usual, banks do not observe , but each bank observes a private noisy signal xi = + 1=2"i,
"i  N (0; 1), with the "i i:i:d: across agents and independent of .
Again, it is easy to see that this setup is included in the model of Section 2 with
 = fr;R; z; b; g, and
R (;m; ) = b   zm, Hk = R  r, and Lk =   (1 + r) ,
where again I redene the state of the economy as b  b    so that R is increasing in the
state of the economy.
8
2.3 The Unique Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the unique equilibrium of the model described in Section 2:1.
While this result is standard, the equilibrium conditions described below will be the starting
point for the subsequent analysis given in paper. But rst, I make standard assumptions
pertaining to the regime change function R and the payo¤ functions which will be maintained
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 1. If R (;m;  ) = 0, then R = 1.
2. If indi¤erent, agent i attacks the regime.
3. For each n 2 f1; ::; Ng, Hn (; ) and Ln (; ), as well as @Hn (; ) =@ and @Ln (; ) =@,
are bounded and integrable with respect to the measure induced by the CDF Fn.
The rst two parts of Assumption 1 are commonly assumed tie-breaking assumptions.
The last part imposes boundedness and integrability conditions on the payo¤ functions and
their derivatives. These technical assumptions are maintained throughout the paper.
Let i : R ! f0; 1g denote agent is strategy. As usual in the literature, I focus on
monotone strategies (also referred to as threshold strategies), that is, strategies where there
is some xi 2 R such that i (xi) = 1 if and only if xi  xi and i (xi) = 0 if xi > xi . The
threshold xi is referred to as the threshold signal, that is, the value of the signal at which
agent i switches from attacking the regime to not attacking it. An equilibrium in which all
agents follow monotone strategies is called a monotone equilibrium.
The next result states that the model has a unique equilibrium and provides the equilib-
rium conditions.11
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium where the regime changes if and only if
   and where all of the following hold:
1. All agents of type sn 2 S use a monotone strategy with threshold xn, where xn is the
unique solution toZ 
 1
Hn (; ) fn (jxn) d +
Z 1

Ln (; ) fn (jxn) d = 0 (1)
2. The regime change threshold  is the unique solution to
R
 
;
NX
n=1
nFn
 
xn   

 1=2
n
!
; 
!
= 0 (2)
11Proofs of this and other results can be found in the Appendix.
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3. In the limit as n !1 for all n = 1; :::; N , the regime change threshold converges to
R
 
;
NX
n=1
n
Hn (; )
Hn (; )  Ln (; ) ; 
!
= 0
The above result establishes that the model has a unique equilibrium which is in monotone
strategies and characterized by N + 1 equations: the N payo¤ indi¤erence equations (one
for each type of agents, per Equation (1)), and the regime change condition (Equation (2)).
It also establishes that in the limit the proportion of agents that attacks the regime when
 =  is given by
PN
n=1 n
Hn(; )
Hn(; ) Ln(; ) .
Having established uniqueness of the equilibrium and derived the equilibrium conditions,
I now turn my attention to the main focus of the paper, that is, the comparative statics
results and the role played by the beliefs in their determination.
3 The Multiplier and Direct E¤ects
The starting point for my analysis is the simple observation that  plays a dual role in
the above system of equilibrium conditions (Equations (1) and (2)). First,  is the actual
equilibrium threshold such that if    then the regime changes, while if  >  the current
regime stays in place (Equation (2)). Second, in the payo¤ indi¤erence condition for type
sn,  corresponds to the agents belief about the regime change threshold (Equation(1)). Of
course, in the equilibrium the actual and the expected regime change thresholds coincide,
but away from equilibrium they might be di¤erent. As I show below, this simple observation
leads to interesting insights into comparative statics predictions of global games.
Let  m 2  be a parameter of interest, and suppose we are interested in understanding
how a change in  m a¤ects the equilibrium thresholds 
 and x. Motivated by the above
discussion, I di¤erentiate between partialand totalchanges in  and x in response to
a change in  m. In particular, I denote by @x

n=@ m the e¤ect that a change in  m has on
type sn agentsthreshold signal when agentsbeliefs about  are held constant. Similarly,
I denote by @=@ m the partial e¤ect of a change in  m on the regime change threshold
when agents strategies care held constant (i.e., with fxngNn=1 held constant).12 Finally,
I denote the total e¤ects of a change in  m on the equilibrium thresholds (including the
e¤ect through the change in beliefs) by d=d m and dxn=d m. In other words, d
=d m
and dxn=d m correspond to the equilibrium e¤ects induced by a change in  m that one
would typically compute when performing comparative statics analysis, while @=@ m and
12Formally, @xn=@ m is computed by applying the implicit function theorem to the payo¤ indi¤erence
condition for type sn with  treated as an exogenous constant, while @=@ m is computed by applying the
implicit function theorem to Equation (2) with fxngNn=1 held constant.
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@xn=@ m correspond to the partial e¤ects implied by a change in  m when ignoring the
adjustments in endogenous variables.
Having introduced the above notation, I now state the main result of the paper, which
all of the subsequent analysis is based on.
Theorem 1 Fix  . For any  m 2  , we have
d
d m
=
1
1 PNn=1 @@xn @xn@| {z }
The Multiplier E¤ect (M( m))
"
@
@ m
+
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@ m
#
| {z }
The Direct E¤ect (D( m))
Moreover,
1. M ( m) 2 (1;1) if n <1 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng.
2. For any  m;  l 2  , we haveM ( m) =M ( l).
3. If n =  for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng, then
lim
!1M =1 and lim!1D ( m) = 0 with lim!1MD 2 R
The rst part of Theorem 1 establishes that a change in  induced by a change in any
parameter of the model can be decomposed into the direct e¤ectand the multiplier e¤ect.
The direct e¤ect captures the e¤ect that a change in  m has on 
 when all agentsbeliefs
about the regime change threshold are held constant (i.e., with  constant in Equation
(1)). In particular, a change in  m can lead to a change in 
 by directly a¤ecting the
regime change condition (as captured by @=@ m), or indirectly by a¤ecting the payo¤
indi¤erence conditions and leading to a change in individual threshold signals while holding
agents beliefs about  unchanged (as captured by (@=@xn) (@xn=@ m)). Both of these
e¤ects are captured by D ( m). Thus, the direct e¤ect captures the fundamental (i.e.,
non-belief) channels through which a change in a parameter a¤ects the equilibrium.
However, following a change in  m, agentsbeliefs are not constant. In particular, agents
understand that a change in  m leads to a change in 
, and hence adjust their beliefs and
actions, inducing a further adjustment in . This leads to another round of adjustments in
agentsbeliefs, and hence in , and so on. These adjustments are captured by the multiplier
e¤ect.Thus, the multiplier e¤ect captures the role that adjustments in beliefs play in the
change in .13
13The above discussion suggests that the decomposition of comparative statics stated in Theorem 1 can be
obtained by analyzing equilibrium best-response dynamics (see, for example, Vives (2004)). Indeed, in the
Appendix I show that the above result can be derived either by using the implicit function theorem or by
computing the best-response dynamics. The latter has the advantage of providing an intuitive interpretation
of this result.
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The second part establishes several important properties of the direct and multiplier
e¤ects. First, it states that the multiplier e¤ect is always positive and greater than 1, but
nite as long as the precision of the information is nite. Second, a change in any element
of  results in the same multiplier e¤ect.14 In other words, if  m and  l are two distinct
parameters of the model, then the di¤erence in the equilibrium e¤ect of changes in  m and  l
are fully attributed to the di¤erence in their direct e¤ects. As a consequence, we can simply
denote the multiplier e¤ect by M. Finally, we see that as agentssignals become innitely
precise the multiplier e¤ect tends to innity, while the direct e¤ect tends to 0, implying that
in the limit all of the adjustments in  are driven by the adjustments in beliefs.
 0
L( , )
H( , )
m
m
0
R( ,m ( ), m)
Panel A: Expected payo¤ as  !1 Panel B: Regime resistance as  !1
Figure 1: Expected payo¤ and regime resistance as a function of  in the limit as  !1
Why do we have lim!1D ( m) = 0 and lim!1M =1? Consider rst the part of the
direct e¤ect that operates through the payo¤indi¤erence condition (i.e., (@=@xn) (@xn=@ m)).
If agent i could observe , then he would always attack the regime if    since in this
case he would be certain to receive payo¤ Hs(i) (; ) > 0. Similarly, he would always re-
frain from attacking if  < , since in this case he would be certain that he would receive
Ls(i) (; ) < 0. Note that this is true regardless of the actual values that Hs(i) (; ) and
Ls(i) (; ) take as long as Hs(i) (; ) > 0 and Ls(i) (; ) < 0. Thus, even if a change
in  m leads to changes in the payo¤ functions H
s(i) (; ) and Ls(i) (; ) this would have
no impact on player is behavior (as depicted on Panel A of Figure 1). But as  ! 1 we
converge to the case where agents can predict  exactly, and thus in the limit @xn=@ m ! 0
for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng.
Note that the above discussion also implies that as  ! 1 the equilibrium proportion
of agents attacking the regime (which I denote by m ()) converges to a step function with
14Note that this does not mean that multiplier e¤ect is independent of parameters of the model. Indeed, in
Section 5 I discuss howM varies with  . Rather, it states that starting with a xed  a small change in any
element of  results in the same multiplier e¤ect.
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m () = 1 for all  >  and m () = 0 for all  <  with m () 2 (0; 1) as determined in
Proposition 1. This, in turn, implies that in the limit the regime change functionR (;m ())
is strictly smaller than 0 for  < , takes the value 0 at  =  and is strictly greater than 0
for all  > . As such, any potential e¤ect of a small change in  m on 
 is always dominated
by the discontinuous jump in the proportion of agents attacking the regime (see Panel B of
Figure 1). As a consequence, in the limit @=@ m = 0.
It is worth stressing that despite its simplicity, Theorem 1 proves to be a surprisingly
useful tool for computing and understanding comparative statics results, as it claries the
role of agentsbeliefs and the channels through which a change in  m a¤ects 
. First, it
tells us that in order to establish whether a change in  m will increase, decrease, or left
unchanged the regime change threshold  it is enough to determine the sign of the direct
e¤ect. Thus, for the purpose of obtaining qualitative predictions, one can treat beliefs as
a xed object, which can substantially simplify the analysis.15 Second, Theorem 1 implies
that the adjustment in beliefs acts like an amplication mechanism that always magnies the
initial response of  to a change in  m. Finally, we see that in order to determine which
parameter has the strongest e¤ect on , it su¢ ces to compare the direct e¤ect induced by
each parameter, the observation that I utilize in Section 3.1. I state the above observations
as a corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider the e¤ect of a change in  m on the equilibrium.
1. The direction of the change in  is determined by the direct e¤ect, that is
sgn

@
@ m

= sgn (D ( m))
2. The adjustment in beliefs always amplies the initial response of , that is, dd m
   @@ m
 ,
with a strict inequality holding whenever @

@ m
6= 0.
3. Suppose that  m 2  leads to the strongest direct e¤ect. Then
d
d m
>
d
d k
for all  k 2  , k 6= m
The remainder of the paper is devoted to investigating further properties of the multiplier
e¤ect (Sections 4 and 5) and understanding further implications of Theorem 1 for comparative
statics analysis (Section 6). Finally, in Section 7 I discuss several extensions of Theorem 1.
15For the application of this approach see Szkup (2017).
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3.1 Application: Design of Investment Subsidies (Sakovics and Steiner,
2012)
Part 3 of Corollary 1 implies that if we want to increase the regime change threshold, then
we should change the parameter  m which is associated with the largest direct e¤ect. This
observation can substantially simplify the analysis of optimal policy design. In this section, I
show how this result can be used to extend the result of Sakovics and Steiner (2012) regarding
the optimal design of investment subsidies. Another potential application of this result is in
the design of optimal nancial regulations.
Consider the model described in Section 2.2.2, where a continuum of investors decides
whether to invest in a risky project.16 Following Sakovics and Steiner (2012), suppose that
a social planner wants to use investment subsidies in order to encourage investment. In
particular, the planner wants to ensure that the threshold below which investment is successful
is at least b, and he wants to achieve this in the least costly way. Let v = (v1; :::; vN ) denote
the vector of subsidies, with vn denoting the subsidy granted to agents of type sn. The
planners problem is then
min
NX
n=1
nvn
s.t.  (v)  b
v > vn  0 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng
where v is the maximum subsidy that can be given to agents (which ensures that the cost of
investing is always non-negative) and where  (v) is the threshold below which investment
is successful when the vector of subsidies is v.
The following result is a simple application of Theorem 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose that for all feasible v we have
D (v1;v)
1
> :::: >
D (vN ;v)
N
Then there exists n 2 f1; :::; Ng such that vn = cn for all n < n, vn = 0 for all n > n, and
vn 2 [0; cn] for n = n.
This result states that if the direct e¤ect of a subsidy to agents in group n is uniformly
greater than the direct e¤ect to group l with l > n, then the planner should fully subsidize
group n rst, and only then subsidize group n+1, if further subsidies are still needed to reach
16 In this case, the action of attacking the status quo is interpreted as investing, while refraining from
challenging the status quo is interpreted as not investing, and  is the inverse measure of the strength of the
economic fundamentals, meaning that a lower value of  is associated with a better state of the economy.
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the desired threshold b. The above result might seem obvious, but it generalizes the results
derived by Sakovics and Steiner (2012) to the case of non-linear payo¤, non-linear regime
change condition, and imperfectly informative signals.17 This is the advantage of Theorem 1:
It substantially simplies analysis of problems that otherwise might seem di¢ cult to solve.18
Proposition 2 also helps us to better understand the intuition behind the choice of subsi-
dies. It implies that if the current level of subsidies is v but the planner would like to further
increase the investment threshold , then on the margin he would subsidize the group with
the largest D (vn;v) =n. Since D (vn;v) = [@=@xn] [@xn=@vn], it follows that on the mar-
gin the planner targets the group of agents which is (1) responsive to the subsidies (high
@xn=@vn) and (2) which is inuential at the aggregate level (high @
=@xn) but (3) relatively
small so the subsidy is not costly (low n). Factors such as the strength of strategic comple-
mentarities between groups or the sensitivity of agents to changes in the aggregate threshold,
which are captured by the multiplier e¤ect, do not play any role in his choice.
4 Understanding the Multiplier E¤ect
In this section, I explore how the multiplier e¤ect identied above is related to the publicity
multiplier and to the strength of strategic complementarities. This analysis is motivated by
the work of Morris and Shin (2003, 2004), who were the rst to argue that in global games
public news has a disproportionately strong impact relative to their informational content
(and who referred to this property of public information as publicity multiplier), and by
the work of Vives (2004, 2014) who stressed that the strength of strategic complementarities
in global games is one of the key parameters of the model.
4.1 Publicity Multiplier
Morris and Shin (2003, 2004) drew attention to the role played by public information as a
coordination device. They show that in global games a public news can have a disproportional
impact on the behavior of players relative to its informational content, and refer to this e¤ect
as the publicity multiplier.19 Below, I investigate how the publicity multiplier is related to
17 In particular, one can verify that in the specication considered by Sakovics and Steiner (2012) the
condition of Proposition 2 is satised.
18Sakovics and Steiner (2012) uncover the fundamental property of global games, which intuitively states
that the amount of optimism in the model is in xed supply, and they base their investigation on this property.
Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, and they should be seen as complementary. In particular,
their approach provides a useful restriction on the equilibrium which can be used to compute the equilibrium
or its properties.
19The role played by public information in global games has been also investigated by Hellwig (2002),
Bannier and Heinemann (2005), and Metz (2002). See also Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan
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the multiplier e¤ect derived above, and revisit the question of when the publicity multiplier
is particularly strong that Morris and Shin (2003) originally explored.
For the purpose of this section, I introduce a proper prior belief into the model and
restrict my attention to the Gaussian information structure and to a single type of agent. In
particular, following Morris and Shin (2003) I assume that all agents are ex-ante identical,
they share a common prior belief   N  ;  1  and each of them receives a private signal
xi = +
 1=2
x "i, with "i  N (0; 1), "i iid across agents, and independent of . Here,  can be
interpreted as the public information available to the agents.20 Finally, as in Morris and Shin
(2003), I assume that  has no direct e¤ect on either payo¤s di¤erential function  (; ) or
the regime change condition R (;m; ) (i.e., @ (; ) =@ = 0 = @R (;m; ) =@), but
a¤ects the equilibrium play only via its impact on agentsposterior beliefs. Otherwise, the
setup is unchanged relative to Section 2.
Let  be the unique equilibrium regime change threshold, and let x be the associated
threshold signal.21 Morris and Shin (2003) dene the publicity multiplier as
P 
dx
d
@x
@
,
where dx=d is the total change in x following a change in the mean of the prior (i.e., in
public information) and @x=@ measures the e¤ect of a change in  through its impact
on agentsposterior beliefs. In other words, dx

d
= P @x@ ; here we di¤erentiate between the
partial and total e¤ects of a change in  on x
 rather than on .
Next, note that  is just one of the parameters of the model, so that  2  . It follows
that a similar multiplier e¤ect can be derived for any  m 2  . Thus, we can dene P ( m)
as the multiplier e¤ect that a change in  m has on x
. Nevertheless,  does have a distinct
property in the current setup:  a¤ects only agentspayo¤ indi¤erence condition (via its
e¤ect on agentsposterior beliefs) but has no e¤ect on the regime change condition. With
this last observation, I can state the following result.
(2007), and Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) for analysis of public information in closely related quadratic-Gaussian
models.
20Equivalently, one can assume that agents have an improper uniform prior over R about , and observe a
public signal  =  + 
 1=2
 ,   N (0; 1).
21With public information, an equilibrium is unique if and only if private precision is precise enough relative
to the precision of the public signal. In the current context, the required condition is
1=2x = >
1p
2
 R2
R1
where R1 is the lower bound on @R=@ and R2 is the upper bound on @R=@m. The derivations of this
condition are standard and hence omitted from the paper.
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Proposition 3 Let  P denote the vector of parameters that a¤ect only the agents payo¤
indi¤erence conditions and let P ( m) denote the multiplier e¤ect associated with the change
in  m 2 P .22 Then
P ( m) =M, implying that
dx
d
=M@x

@
for all  m 2  P
The above proposition has two implications. First, it implies that there is nothing special
about the publicity multiplierand that such a multiplier applies to any parameter  m 2
 P . Second, we see that the e¤ect of this multiplier, which is associated with the comparative
statics of x, is the same as that which is associated with changes in .
The fact that P ( m) = M has important consequences: It implies that the publicity
multiplier P () tends to tends to innity as x !1 and achieves its maximum valuewhen
public information is ignored by the agents. The latter observation seems counter-intuitive,
as it seems to suggest that public information has the strongest impact when agents ignore it.
The solution to this apparent contradiction is simple. As the precision of private information
increases, agents attach less and less weight to the public information, and hence the direct
e¤ect of a higher  decreases. The decrease in the direct e¤ect dominates the increase in the
multiplier e¤ect, and thus the total impact of public information on equilibrium threshold
tends to 0 as  !1. Thus, Morris and Shin (2003) are correct to point out that  has the
strongest impact on the equilibrium when   is high, but this is driven to a large degree by
the direct e¤ect rather than the multiplier e¤ect.
Following Morris and Shin (2003), in Proposition 3 I restricted my attention to parameters
of the model that a¤ects only the payo¤ indi¤erence condition and considered a setup with a
single type of agents. One may wonder whether these restrictions are important for the result.
Not surprisingly, they do not, and a similar decomposition of the total change in dx=d m
into the multiplier e¤ect and the partial e¤ect can be derived (Section D.1 in the Appendix).
Thus, I conclude that the model features a unique multiplier e¤ectM irrespective of whether
we focus on the change in x or the change in , or which parameter of the model we consider.
4.2 Relation to Strategic Complementarities
In this section, I investigate the relation between the magnitude of the multiplier e¤ect and
the strength of strategic complementarities. The analysis is motivated by ndings of Vives
(2014), who stressed that the degree of strategic complementarity of investorsactions is the
crucial parameter (...) for policy analysis and used this insight to show that the e¤ect of
nancial regulation depends on the strength of strategic complementarities. Since, as shown
in Theorem 1, the multiplier e¤ect determines the overall e¤ect of a given parameter change
22 In other words, @R=@ m = 0 for all  m 2 P .
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on the equilibrium, this suggests that there is a close connection between the magnitude of
the multiplier e¤ect and the degree of strategic complementarity of agentsactions. The main
goal of this section is to understand this relation.
Typically, one measures the degree of strategic complementarity by the steepness of the
agentsbest-response functions. To compute best-response functions suppose that all agents
use threshold strategies, and let bxn be the threshold used by all the agents of types sn,
n = 1; :::; N . Let bx = fbx1; :::; bxNg be the vector of these thresholds, and denote by b (bx) the
implied regime change threshold. Given that all other agents use monotone strategies, the
best response of agent i is to use a monotone function with a threshold signal s(i) (bx), where
s(i) (bx) is implicitly dened as the unique solution to agent is indi¤erence conditionZ b(bx)
 1
Hs(i) (; ) fs(i)

js(i) (bx) d + Z 1b(bx) Ls(i) (; ) fs(i)

js(i) (bx) d = 0
The above equation denes implicitly the best-response function for agents of type s (i),
s(i) (bx).
To measure the strength of strategic complementarities, one can ask how much s(i) (bx)
increases as all the bxn, n = 1; :::; N , increase by a small amount. This is equivalent to
computing the directional derivative of s(i) (bx) in the direction 1 = (1; :::; 1)T 2 RN . I
denote this directional derivative by r1s(i) (bx), where
r1s(i) (bx) = NX
n=1
@s(i) (bx)
@ (bxn)
Using this denition, strategic complementarities are stronger when the best-response func-
tions are steeper.
While natural, the above denition is cumbersome to use in practice. This is because in
order to determine how the strength of strategic complementarities varies with the parameters
of the model, we must compare the best-response functions on their entire domains, which is
often challenging. It also su¤ers from the problem that in many cases a change in the setup
will result in a best-response function becoming steeper at some bx but atter at others.23
Proposition 4 o¤ers a solution to this problem. Specically, it establishes that the mag-
nitude of the multiplier e¤ect, and hence the total e¤ect of the change in , is determined
by the slope of the best-response function evaluated at bx = x, where x = (x1; :::; xN ) is the
vector of equilibrium signal thresholds. Thus, from the comparative statics point of view the
relevant measure of the strategic complementarities in global games is the slope of the best-
response function evaluated at bx = x, where x = (x1; :::; xN ) is the vector of equilibrium
23To circumvent this problem, Vives (2014) suggests using the maximal value of the slope of the best-response
function as the measure of strategic complementarities.
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signal thresholds, r1n (x). I refer to this measure as the equilibrium degree of strategic
complementarities (as it involves computing the slope of the best-response function at the
equilibrium signal thresholds).
Proposition 4 Let n denote the best-response function for type sn, n = 1; :::; N . Then the
following hold:
1. The multiplier e¤ect is equal to
M = 1
1 
NP
n=1
wnr1n (x)
;
where x = (x1; :::; xN ) is the vector of equilibrium signal thresholds and
wn =
@=@xn
Nl=1@
=@xl
measures the relative sensitivity of  to changes in xn, n = 1; :::; N .
2. If n <1 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng, then
r1n (x) < 1 andM <1
Moreover, if n !1 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng, then
r1n (x)! 1andM!1
The result establishes the link between the equilibrium degree of strategic complemen-
tarities in the model and the multiplier e¤ect. It tells us that the multiplier e¤ect is strong
precisely when the equilibrium strategic complementaritiesare strong (Part 1 of the Propo-
sition). This identies r1n (x) as the relevant measure of strategic complementarities in
the model. Second, Proposition 4 indicates that the equilibrium strategic complementarities
are maximized in the limit as  !1 which explains why the multiplier e¤ect tends to 1 in
this case.
One may wonder how, in the limit as information becomes arbitrarily precise, the strength
of strategic complementarities in the global game compares with the strength of strategic
complementarities in the complete information game. In the Appendix (Section D.3) I show
that they are equally strong. This observation underscores the important di¤erence between
global games and complete information models, namely the presence of strategic uncer-
taintyin global games, which is missing in complete information frameworks. Thus, while it
is true that the strength of strategic complementarities increases with the precision of private
signals, so does the strategic uncertainty, which is maximized precisely in the limit as the
noise in the signals disappears (see Morris and Shin (2003)). In other words, even though
the incentives to coordinate in global game model are the highest when  ! 1, agents are
unable to coordinate their actions e¤ectively.
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5 When Is the Multiplier E¤ect Strong?
As argued in Section 3, the multiplier e¤ect acts as an amplication mechanism in the model,
always magnifying the initial e¤ect of changes to parameters. In the applied global game liter-
ature, such changes in parameters are often interpreted as policy adjustments or unexpected
shocks to an economic environment. One of the key aspects of such analysis is understanding
when the amplication mechanism is strong, so that impacts of such shocks greatly exceed
their direct e¤ect. The goal of this section is to answer this question.
I rst consider the setup of Section 2:1 and provide intuition as to when we should expect
the multiplier e¤ect to be large. However, at this level of generality, it is di¢ cult to establish
sharp predictions regarding the size of the multiplier e¤ect. Therefore, in what follows I
consider a simplied model with a single type of agent, where the regime change condition is
linear in  and m, and where agents payo¤s are piecewise-constant. Within this simple setup,
I provide a full characterization of the conditions under which multiplier e¤ect is large. It is
worth stressing that despite its simplicity, this simple modelis popular in applications (for
the recent applications see Morris and Shin, 2016, or Vives, 2014). Finally, in Section 5.3 I
show how the results established below can help us understand when a small shock to banks
capital can result in a credit freeze, as was the case during the Great Recession (see Bebchuk
and Goldstein (2011), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), or Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)).
5.1 The General Model
As shown in Section 4.2, the multiplier e¤ect is strong when the equilibrium strategic com-
plementarities are strong. Thus, understanding under which conditions the multiplier e¤ect
is strong boils down to understanding when agents have strong motives to coordinate their
actions. This happens when a small change in xn results in a relatively large adjustment in
 (i.e., @=@xn is large) and, in turn, the change in 
 has a relatively large impact on xn
(i.e., @xn=@
 is large).
By inspection of the equilibrium regime change condition, we see that
@
@xn
/ @
@m
R (;m () ; ) f
 
xn   

 1=2
n
!
,
implying that @=@xn is large when a change in xn results in a large change in the proportion
of agents attacking the regime (i.e., f


1=2
n (xn   )

is high) and the regime is sensitive to
changes in the proportion of agents attacking

i.e., @R

;Nn=1Fn


1=2
n (x   )

; 

=@m is high)

.
Similarly, by inspection of the agentsindi¤erence condition, we see that
@xn
@
/ [Hn (; )  Ln (; )] f
 
xn   

 1=2
n
!
,
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implying that xn is sensitive to changes in 
 when the payo¤ di¤erence between successful
attack and unsuccessful attack is large at  (large Hn (; )  Ln (; )), and when, con-
ditional on observing the threshold signal xn, agents assign a high probability to  lying in a
close neighborhood of . This is because, in this case, a small change in  results in a large
increase in the expected utility di¤erence between attacking and not attacking the regime at
the critical signal xn, prompting agents to increase their threshold signals sharply.
Beyond this broad intuition, little more can be said without imposing more structure
on the model. Thus, in what follows I consider a simple setup which is more amenable to
analysis.
5.2 The Simple Model
In this section, I consider a setup with only one type of agent, where the agents payo¤
functions are constant in , that is, H () = H > 0 and L () = L < 0, and where the regime
change function is linear in  and in the proportion of agents that attack the regime, m, that
is
R (;m) =    zm,
where z > 0 is a parameter that captures the sensitivity of the regime to actions of agents.
Each agent receives a private signal xi =  + 
 1=2
x "i, "i  N (0; 1), with the "i independent
across agents and independent of , and they all share a common prior   N

; 
 1=2


.
As mentioned earlier, this setup is common in applications.24 Finally, it is convenient to
dene    L= (H   L).
Notation 1 Let    LH L .
The parameter  measures the relative benet of a successful attack to the cost of unsuc-
cessful attack. Note that  2 (0; 1), tends to 0 as H !1 or L! 0 and tends to 1 as H ! 0
or L!  1. In this setup, the multiplier e¤ect is given by
M = 1
1  x+x

1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )

1+
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )
 .
25 (3)
24The analysis of this section can be extended to the case of an arbitrary distribution of signals, but only
when the prior is uninformative (i.e., uniform improper prior). Below, I limit myself to the case of a Gaussian
information structure (with a proper prior), as such an information structure is by far the most popular in
applications.
25See Section A of the Appendix
21
Finally, dene   ( ) as the highest value of   for which the model has a unique equi-
librium for a given  ; that is,   ( ) = 
1=2
x
p
2
  R2=R1 where R1 is the lower bound on
@R=@ and R2 is the upper bound on @R=@m.26
5.2.1 The multiplier e¤ect as a function of , z, and 
Let   m denote the vector containing all the models parameters except  m. The next
proposition characterizes how, for a given information structure (i.e., holding x and  
xed), the multiplier e¤ect varies with the parameters.
Proposition 5 For a xed information structure, dene a function g : R3 ! R+ by
g
 
;z; 

=
   12z +
p
x +  
 
 1 ()

1. The multiplier e¤ect is strong when g is low and achieves its maximum strength when
g
 
;z; 

= 0.
2. For each  m 2

;z; 
	
, with   m held constant, there exists b m    m 2 R such
that the multiplier e¤ect is increasing in  m for all  m < b m    m, achieves a
maximum at b m    m, and is decreasing in  m for all  m > b m    m.
The above proposition follows from the observation that M is a decreasing function of
jx   j. In the simple model considered in this section, there is a one-to-one mapping
between the value of g and the distance between x and . In other words, as g increases
so does jx   j, which translates into a lowM. The second part of the proposition follows
directly from the rst part. It states that, holding other parameters constant, the multiplier
e¤ect is weak when  m 2

;z; 
	
takes extreme values and increases as  m moves closer
to b m    m, where b m    m is the value of  m for which g  ;z;  = 0.
To understand why the multiplier e¤ect is weak when , z, or  take extreme values,
in light of Proposition 4, it su¢ ces to understand why in these cases the strategic comple-
mentarities are weak. Note that agent i has weak incentives to coordinate his action with
others when, from the ex-ante perspective, one of the actions is more attractive than the
other. For example, when  is high, the benet from a successful attack compared to the
loss from an unsuccessful attack is large, and thus an agent is willing to take the risk and
attack even if he believes that few agents will. When z is high, the regime is likely to collapse
even if only few agents will attack, and hence again the agent is willing to attack even if he
believs that few other agents will. Finally, when  is low, agent i believs that the regime
change will occur regardless of the actions of other agents, and again he is inclined to attack
26Derivations of  ( ) are standard and hence omitted from the paper.
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irrespective of the proportion of agents that attacks the regime. It follows that in all these
cases, agents have weak incentives to coordinate their actions, and hence both the strategic
complementarities and the multiplier e¤ect are weak. When , z, or  take intermediate
values, then the expected payo¤ from each action depends greatly on the actions of others,
and hence each agent has strong incentives to coordinate with others.
5.2.2 The multiplier e¤ect as a function of x and  
Next, I investigate how the multiplier e¤ect varies with x and  . This is a more subtle
question, since a change in   or x a¤ects the multiplier e¤ect through two channels. First,
it a¤ects the sensitivity of x to changes in the regime change threshold  ((x +  ) =x in
the denominator in Equation (3)). Second, it a¤ects the sensitivity of the regimes strength
to changes in the proportion of agents attacking (as captured by the other factor in that
term in the denominator in Equation (3)). These e¤ects often work in the opposite direction,
making it challenging to establish how a change in   or x will a¤ect the multiplier e¤ect.
First, consider changes in x.
Proposition 6 There exists x such that for all x > x we have @M@x > 0.
This result states that for su¢ ciently high x the multiplier e¤ect is strictly increasing in
x; a result that should not be surprising in light of Theorem 1. If   ! 0, one can strengthen
this result and show thatM is always increasing in x. However, once we allow for informative
public information, it is possible that the multiplier e¤ect will be a non-monotone function
of x for intermediate levels of private precision.
Next, consider changes in  .
Proposition 7 For each  , there exists L ( ) ; H ( ) 2 R with L ( ) < H ( ) such
that @M@  0 if and only if  2 [L ( ) ; H ( )], with a strict inequality holding if  2
(L ( ) ; H ( )).
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This result establishes that an increase in the precision of public information increases the
multiplier e¤ect if  takes intermediate values, and decreases it otherwise. This is because
a change in   a¤ects M through two channels, which tend to work in opposite directions.
On the one hand, a higher   increases (x +  ) =x, which tends to increaseM, the e¤ect
which is independent of . On the other hand, for extreme values of , an increase in  
tends to increase the distance between x and , which decreases the sensitivity of  to
changes in x decreasingM.
27The bounds L () and H () depend on all other parameters of the model, besides . Each panel of
Figure 2 shows for example how they vary with  for a given value of . However, for notational convenience
I suppress this dependence.
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To understand why the distance between x and  increases in response to an increase
in  , consider the case when  is high (the case of low  is analogous). When  is high
agents expect the regime to be strong, and hence they are willing to attack it only if their
signals are low, implying that x < . In this situation, an increase in   reinforces the belief
that the regime is strong, further decreasing x and further increasing the distance jx   j.
This e¤ect becomes stronger as  increases, since the same increase in   leads to a larger
increase in the agentsposterior beliefs in the strength of the regime, and hence to a larger
fall in x. For su¢ ciently large , this second e¤ect dominates and, as a consequenceM is
decreasing in  .
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Figure 2: The e¤ect of an increase in   on the multiplier e¤ect
Figure 2 depicts how the region where dM=d  > 0 changes as   increases. We see that
this region shrinks rapidly as   increases, and thus at high values of   a further increase
in the precision of public information tends to decrease the multiplier e¤ect. To understand
why this is the case, note that the posterior belief of an agent who receives the threshold
signal, which is given by
xx
 +  
x +  
,
is a convex function of  . Thus, when the precision of public information is already high, a
further increase in   has a larger e¤ect on the posterior belief of such a player than when
  is low. As a consequence, the negative e¤ect of an increase in   onM described above is
stronger for all values of  when   is already high. On the other hand, the positive e¤ect of
an increase in   onM is independent of  . As a consequence the region where dM=d  > 0
shrinks as   increases. Note that Figure 2 implies that, for most parameter values,M is a
non-monotone function of   as   is varied from 0 to  .
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5.3 Application: Credit Freezes and Amplication of Small Shocks
Current accounts of the Great Recession tend to emphasize how a relatively small shock to the
economy resulted in the deepest recession since the Great Depression (see e.g., Brunnermeier
(2009)) and the freeze of interbank and credit markets (see, for example, Duchin, Ozbas, and
Sensoy (2010) or Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). Using a global game model, Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2011) emphasize how a small shock to bankscapital (when amplied by strategic
complementarities) can lead to a freeze in lending to private sector, and analyze policies that
can help to prevent such an outcome.28 In this section I provide conditions under which such
an amplication mechanism is likely to be strong.
In particular, note that the framework of Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) ts into the
simple framework considered in Section 5:2. Therefore, we obtain the following result, which
is an immediate corollary of Propositions 5 and 6.
Corollary 2 For a xed information structure dene
gBG (; ; r; R) =
   12z +
p
x +  
 
 1

1 + r
1 +R

As gBG decreases, the strength of the amplication mechanism increases, achieving its max-
imum when g (; z; r; R) = 0. Moreover, if the precision of private information is high
(x > x), then the strength of the amplication mechanism is increasing in x.
Corollary 2 provides potentially important insights for design of macroeconomic pruden-
tial policies and nancial regulations. First, it stresses that strategic complementarities in
lending can be large even if the complementarities at the macroeconomic level are weak (small
z). Moreover, it suggests that even if the credit market look robust (high R or high ), a
small shock can still have a large e¤ect on the provision of credit if gBG takes a low value.
Thus, when analyzing the vulnerability of a market, regulators should consider all the above
variables jointly, and explicitly take into account the links between them. Finally, Corollary
2 states that resolving informational asymmetries, as captured by an increase in x, may
increase the strength of the amplication mechanism present in the credit market, making
the market more vulnerable.
6 Implications for Comparative Statics Analysis
In this section, I show how Theorem 1 can shed light on the following important questions
about comparative statics results: (1) When can comparative statics results in a global game
model be deduced directly from the model primitives? (2) When are comparative statics
28See Section 2.2 for a description of this environment.
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predictions of global games independent of the particular information structure chosen for
the analysis (i.e., when are they robustto changes in the information structure)? (3) When
do comparative statics di¤er from predictions under complete information based on analysis
of the extremal equilibria?
6.1 Robust Predictions and Predictions Based on the Models Primitives
As discussed in Section 3, Theorem 1 implies that in order to determine whether a change
in a parameter of the model increases or decreases , it su¢ ces to focus on the direct e¤ect.
In this section, I go a step further and analyze the direct e¤ect to determine when the
comparative statics results can be deduced from the primitives and when they do not depend
on the assumed information structure.
Note that there is a close relationship between the conditions under which the sign of
comparative statics can be deduced from the models primitives and those under which their
sign does not depend on the assumed information structure. This is because, in order to
deduce comparative statics results from the primitives, it must be the case that the e¤ect of
a change in a parameter on the regime change function R and the payo¤ functions  does
not depend on  and m. Otherwise, we would need to know  and m () in order to
determine the e¤ect of a change in  m, and these are objects that we can compute only by
solving for the equilibrium. However, changes in the information structure a¤ect precisely
 and m () and not the models primitives. It follows that if we can deduce comparative
statics from the models primitives then these results are robustto alternative information
structures and vice versa.
The next corollary provide a general, easy-to-check, condition under which sgn (d=d m)
can be determined from the models primitives and does not depend on the assumed infor-
mation structure.
Corollary 3 Fix  . Suppose that for all  2 R and m 2 [0; 1], we have
@R (;m; )
@ m
 () 0 and @
n (; )
@ m
 () 0, n = 1; :::; N (4)
Then
1. d

d m
 () 0.
2. sgn

d
d m

is independent of the assumed information structure (i.e., unchanged for
any choice of fFngNn=1).
This result follows from the observation that
sgn (D ( m)) = sgn
 
@R
@ m
+
NX
n=1
@R
@xn
@xn
@ m
!
,
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where @R=@xn < 0 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng, as a higher threshold implies a higher proportion of
agents attacking the regime. The above condition is intuitive: It states that d=d m > 0 if
an increase in  m increases the relative payo¤s from attacking the regime and/or it decreases
the resistance of the regime to attack. It should be stressed that while the hypothesis of
Corollary 3 is simple, it is satised in many applications. For example, I show below that all
the parameters (with exception of ) in Morris and Shin (1998) satisfy this condition. This
is also true of the simple model considered in Section 5:2 (again with exception of precision
parameters x and  ).
What if the hypothesis of Corollary 3 is not satised? In that case, without imposing
either more structure on the model or further conditions on the models primitives, we might
be unable to deduce comparative statics from the models primitives and cannot guarantee
that they do not depend on the imposed information structure. In the Appendix I provide
two examples of non-robust predictions. In the rst example, R is increasing in  m for some
values of  andm but decreasing for others. In that case, a change in the information structure
may shift the equilibrium threshold  and the equilibrium proportion of agents that attack
the regime m (), from the region where @R=@ m > 0 to the region where @R=@ m < 0. In
the second example, a change in  m decreases the payo¤ functions (@n=@ m < 0) but also
decreases the resilience of the regime (@R=@ m). In this situation, the information structure
may determine which e¤ect dominates. However, it should be stressed that such situations
tends to arise only in relatively complex models and most parameters, and that in most of the
canonical models the su¢ cient condition for robustnessidentied in Corollary 3 is satised.
A stronger result regarding the robustness of predictions to the changes in information
structure can be achieved if we assume that payo¤ di¤erential functions are piecewise con-
stant, that is Hn (; ) = Hn > 0 and Ln (; ) = Ln < 0.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Hn (; ) = Hn > 0 and L (; ) = Ln < 0 for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng.
Then the models predictions do not depend on the information structure.
When the payo¤s do not depend on , the proportion of agents that attacks the regime
at the equilibrium threshold  is determined by the payo¤s fHn; LngNn=1 only (see part
(3) of Proposition 1). As such, the equilibrium threshold , and hence its comparative
statics, also do not depends on the information structure. Note that this robustnessresult
holds without the need for additional restrictions on the regime change function R that were
needed in Corollary 3. However, it does requires the strong assumption of constant payo¤s.
Furthermore, it will not hold if we assume that players have a proper prior belief. Further
analysis of robustness of comparative statics results in global games, while important, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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6.2 Comparison with Predictions of the Model with Complete Information
Finally, I close this section by comparing the predictions of the global game model with mod-
els with complete information. In the complete information version of the setup described in
Section 2, all agents observe  once it has been realized. It is well-known that in this case
any threshold b 2  ( ) ;  ( ) can be supported as an equilibrium. The boundaries  ( )
and  ( ) of this multiplicity region constitute the smallest and the largest equilibrium,
respectively, of the compete information model.29 The predictions of the complete informa-
tion model are then often based on the behavior of  ( ) and  ( ) in response to changes in
 m 2  .
Let R = f m 2  j@R=@ m 6= 0g and P = f m 2  j@n=@ m 6= 0 for some n 2 (1; :::; N)g
so that  R is the vector of all the parameters that a¤ect the regime change condition while
 P is the vector of all parameters that a¤ect the payo¤ functions. Note that a change in
 m 2  R a¤ects the extremal equilibria if and only if  m a¤ects the regime change condition
(@R=@ m 6= 0). This is because  ( ) and  ( ) are dened as solutions to 0 = R ( ( ) ; 0; )
and 0 = R
 
 ( ) ; 1; 

, respectively. Thus, in contrast to the global game model, a change
in  m 2  P n R has no e¤ect on the extremal equilibria. This last observation is worth em-
phasizing, as it constitutes one of the advantages of global game selection over other selection
mechanisms based on the complete information game.
Corollary 4 Consider the e¤ect of change in  m on 
,  and . Suppose  m 2  R and
that @R=@ m > (<) 0 and @n=@ m  () 0 for all  and m. Then,
sgn

d
d m

= sgn

d ( )
d m

= sgn

d ( )
d m

On the other hand, if  m 2  P n R then the predictions of the two models will di¤er.
6.3 Example: Comparative Statics Result in Morris and Shin (1998)
In this section, I show how Corollaries 3 and 4 can be used to simplify and extend analysis
of the global game model. As an example, I consider the model of Morris and Shin (1998)
described in Section 2.2.1. In that setup we have  = fv; e; t; g, where v captures the benet
of maintaining the currency peg, e is the prevailing xed exchange rate, t is the transaction
cost of attacking the peg, and  is the precision of agents information; the resilience of the
29To be precise, the strategy prole
n

i
o
i2[0;1]
where 
i
() = 1 if    ( ) and 
i
() = 0 otherwise,
i 2 [0; 1], constitutes the smallest equilibrium of the complete information setup, with  ( ) being the implied
regime change threshold. Similarly, the strategy prole

i ()
	
i2[0;1], where i () = 1 if    ( ) and
i () = 0 otherwise, i 2 [0; 1], constitutes the largest equilibrium of the complete information setup, with
 ( ) being the implied regime change threshold.
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regime and the payo¤ functions are given by R (;m; ) = v c (;m), H (; ) = e f () t,
and L (; ) =  t. Finally, let  denote the unique global game regime change threshold.
By inspection of functions R, H, and L, we see that an increase in v a¤ects only R and
always increases the resilience of the peg. On the other hand, changes in e and t a¤ect only
the payo¤ functions and do so monotone fashion. Thus, Corollary 3 implies that
d
dv
< 0,
d
de
> 0, and
d
dt
< 0
Moreover, these predictions do not depend on the information structure assumed (i.e., they
do not depend on the value of  or the choice of the distribution of noise, F ). How do these
predictions compare with those based on the extremal equilibria of the complete information
model? From Corollary 4, both models predict that increase in v makes a collapse of the peg
more likely. On the other hand, changes in t or e have no e¤ect on the extremal equilibria
of the complete information model.
7 Extensions of Theorem 1
In this section, I provide two extensions of Theorem 1. First, I show that a similar decom-
position applies to the case when several parameters are changed at the same time. Second,
I discuss how Theorem 1 extends to environments with multiple equilibria.
7.1 A Simultaneous Change in Multiple Parameters
So far I have considered only the e¤ect of a change in a single parameter on the regime
change threshold . It turns out that Theorem 1 can be extended to describe the e¤ect of a
simultaneous change in several parameters of the model on the regime change threshold .
Such a result might be particularly useful in nance applications, such as in the analysis of
banking regulations where one is interested in the e¤ect of changing several aspects of the
model at once (for example liquidity requirements and maturity structure requirements).
Fix K > 1, and let

 m1 ; :::;  mK
	   be a subset of the parameters of the model.
Suppose that we are interested in computing the e¤ect that a simultaneous small change in
 m1 ; :::;  mK has on 
. To this end, let us write  explicitly as a function of  m1 ; :::;  mK ,
that is 
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

(since other parameters are kept constant, we ignore them in what
follows). Now, denote by ru
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

the directional derivative of  in the direction
u, where u 2 RK . Then a simultaneous small change in  m1 ; :::;  mK is captured by direc-
tional derivative of 
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

in the direction of 1 = (1; :::; 1) 2 RK .30 We can now
state the following result, which extends Theorem 1 to the case of a simultaneous change in
multiple parameters.
30The direction 1 = (1; :::; 1) implies that all K parameters change at the same rate.
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Proposition 8 Let

 m1 ; :::;  mK
	
be a subset of the parameters of the model and let 
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

denote  as a function of these parameters when other parameters are held constant. Then
r1
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

=M
KX
k=1
D   mk ,
whereM and D   mi are dened as in Theorem 1.
Thus, we see that the results established above extend to the case of simultaneous small
changes in multiple parameters.
7.2 The Multiplier E¤ect in the Model with Multiple Equilibria
The analysis above was conducted under the assumption that the model has a unique equi-
librium. One may wonder if Theorem 1 generalizes in some form to settings that feature
multiple monotone equilibria, each characterized by a di¤erent regime change threshold b.31
The challenge of obtaining predictions based on a model with multiple equilibria stems
from the fact that following any change in the model, the agents can simply coordinate on
di¤erent equilibrium, which makes predictions in models with multiple equilibria problematic.
However, one may still be interested in computing comparative statics results of a regime
change threshold b associated with a particular equilibrium. In this case db=d m for some
 m 2  should be interpreted as a change in a threshold that characterizes a particular
equilibrium.32
Suppose that the model stated in Section 2 has multiple monotone equilibria. This can
happen, for example, if all agents share a common prior belief G that is informative enough
compared to private signals (see, for example, Hellwig (2002) or Morris and Shin (2004)).
Below, I discuss how Theorem 1 extends to settings with multiple equilibria.
To state the main result of this section, I will need the following denition of stability of
equilibria (see, for example, Vives (2004)).
Denition 1 (Stability) Let b0 denote agentsinitial belief about the regime change thresh-
old. A monotone equilibrium characterized by the regime change threshold b is stable if
31 In what follows I denote by b the regime change threshold associated with a particular monotone equi-
librium, and by  the actual threshold below which the regime changes in equilibrium (where  corresponds
to one of the bs). See also the discussion below.
32More precisely, let b1 and b2 be two distinct thresholds associated with two di¤erent monotone equilibria.
Suppose that initially  = b1 and that  m increases. We can compute how a change in  m a¤ects b1 and b2
(that is db1=d m and db2=d m). But since agents may switch from playing the equilibrium with thresholdb1 to the equilibrium with threshold b2, we cannot associate db1=d m with the change in  induced by the
change in  m. In other words, with multiple equilibria, comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds are not
necessarily equivalent to the actual model predictions.
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9" > 0 such that for all b0 2 (   ";  + ") the best-response dynamics initiated at b0 con-
verge to b. A monotone equilibrium that is not stable is called unstable.
It turns out that Theorem 1 remains valid as long as we focus on stable equilibria.33 In
particular, one can show that db=d m =MD ( m), whereM and D ( m) are dened as
in Theorem 1;M2 (1;1) so that sgn

db=d m = sgn (D ( m)); and the multiplier e¤ect
has the natural interpretation of an amplication mechanism that can be derived using best-
response dynamics.34 There are two reasons why Theorem 1 extends to stable equilibria.
First, the actual derivation of the decomposition of db=d m in the proof of Theorem 1
did not utilize the fact that the equilibrium is unique. Indeed, they remain valid for any
equilibrium that does not disappear following a change in  m. Second, the necessary and
su¢ cient condition for M 2 (1;1) and for the best-response dynamics to converge is thatPN
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@ < 1 when evaluated at the initial equilibrium threshold. But, as discussed
in Section G of the Appendix, this is exactly the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
equilibrium to be stable.
The situation is di¤erent when we consider an unstable equilibrium. While the decompo-
sition of comparative statics results into the direct and multiplier e¤ects remains valid, the
multiplier e¤ect loses its natural interpretation as capturing the change induced by adjust-
ments in beliefs. This is because when an equilibrium is unstable the best-response dynamics
diverge, as a small change in  m will make agent switch from playing unstable equilibrium to
playing the closest stable equilibrium. This implies a large discrete adjustment in the regime
change threshold  regardless of how small the initial change in  m is. As a consequence,
the multiplier e¤ect computed using best-response dynamics is innite. On the other hand, if
we compute the multiplier e¤ect directly using the implicit function theorem as in the proof
of Theorem 1, the resulting multiplier e¤ect is negative. The di¤erence between the two
approaches steps from the fact that the best-response dynamics describe the change in the
equilibrium play following a change in a parameter, while the implicit theorem characterizes
the change in the given equilibrium threshold. While in the case of stable equilibria these
two approaches coincide, this does not occur in the case of an unstable equilibrium.
I summarize the above discussion in Proposition 9.
33From Van Zandt and Vives (2007) we know that global games belong to the class of so-called monotone
supermodular games, which always have the smallest and largest equilibria that are in monotone strategies
and stable. In global games, monotone equilibria can be ordered by the value of the regime change threshold
 associated with them.
34Part 3 of Theorem 1 does not generalize, since as we consider a sequence of precision levels that tends
to innity, at some point along such a sequence some equilibria may disappear, which means that for these
equilibria lim!1M and lim!1D ( m) are not dened.
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Proposition 9 Suppose that the model features multiple monotone equilibria. Consider a
particular equilibrium and the associated regime change threshold b. Let M and D ( m) be
dened as in Theorem 1.
1. If a monotone equilibrium is stable, then for any  m 2  we have db=d m = M
D ( m), sgn

db=d m = sgn (D ( m)),M2 (1;1), and the best-response dynamics
following a small change in  m converge.
2. If a monotone equilibrium is unstable, then for any  m 2  we have db=d m =
M  D ( m), but sgn

db=d m =  sgn (D ( m)), M < 0, and the best-response
dynamics following a small change in  m diverge.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, I provided a general analysis of comparative statics in a general global game
model. The central result of the paper is the decomposition of the comparative statics results
into the direct e¤ect and the multiplier e¤ect. Despite its simplicity, this decomposition
proves to be a surprisingly powerful tool for deriving and interpreting comparative statics
results in global games models.
In the remainder of the paper, I analyzed the direct e¤ect and the multiplier e¤ect. In
particular, I related the multiplier e¤ect to the publicity multiplierof Morris and Shin (2003,
2004) and to the strength of strategic complementarities present in the model. Furthermore,
I used these insights to characterize conditions under which the multiplier e¤ect is strong, so
that a small shock to the model, when amplied by the endogenous adjustments in beliefs,
results in large equilibrium adjustments. I then analyzed the direct e¤ect. This analysis
allowed me to identify conditions under which (1) comparative statics results can be deduced
from the model primitives, (2) comparative statics results are independent of the assumed
information structure, and (3) predictions based on the global game coincide with those of
the underlying complete information model..
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the results stated in the paper and is divided into seven sections, with
each section of the appendix corresponding to a particular section of the paper (with exception of Section A
which contains the preliminary results that I use in my analysis). In Section B I provide the proof of Proposition
1, and in Section C I present the proof of Theorem 1. Section D includes the proofs of Propositions 3 and
4 as well as proofs of related results discussed in the paper. In Section E I provide proofs of Propositions
5 7. Finally, Section F contains the proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4, and Section G includes the proofs of the
extensions of Theorem 1 (i.e., Propositions 8 and 9). Several of the more involved proofs are only sketched
here; complete proofs can be found in the Online Appendix available at the authors website.
A Preliminary Results
In this section, I list the intermediate claims used to establish results of Section 2 and 5 of the paper. See the
Online Appendix for their proofs.
A.1 Preliminary Claims for the Results of Section 2
Lemma A.1 is key to establishing the equilibrium thresholds f; x1; :::; xNg converge to a nite limit precision
of private information tends to innity.
Lemma A.1 Consider a sequence fxng1n=1  [a; b]. If all the convergent subsequences of this sequence have
the same nite limit L, then the full sequence also has
Note that this result allows us to focus on convergent subsequences in our analysis of limiting behavior of
thresholds. Then, if we conrm the hypothesis of this lemma, we know that this limiting behavior is passed
onto the sequence itself.
A.2 Preliminary Claims for the Results of Section 5
In Section 5:2 I consider a simplied model with a single type of agent, where the payo¤ di¤erential function
is piecewise constant, but where agents have a proper prior. I further assume that the private signals and the
prior belief have normal distribution. In that setup, x denotes the precision of the private signal (common
to all agents),  denotes the precision of the common prior, and  denotes the mean of the prior belief. The
results listed below utilize all of these assumptions.
Lemma A.2 Consider the setup of Section 5:2, and suppose that

1=2
x

>
1
z
1p
2
Then the equilibrium signal threshold is given by
x =
x + 
x
   
x
  
p
x + 
x
 1 () (5)
and the equilibrium regime change threshold  is the unique solution to
   z



1=2
x
(   ) 
p
x + 
x
 1 ()

= 0 (6)
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Notation 2 I refer to the condition
1=2x = > (1=z)

1=
p
2

as the uniqueness condition.
This condition is maintained for all the results of Section 5:2 (i.e., all the results pertaining to the simple
model discussed there).
Lemma A.3 In the simple framework of Section 5:2, the multiplier e¤ect is given by
1
1  x+
x
z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )

1+z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )

Lemma A.4 Dene
 
1
2
z  
p
x + 

 1 ()
1. x    > 0 if  < .
2. x    = 0 if  = .
3. x    < 0 if  > .
Moreover, lim!1 (x
   ) =  1 and lim! 1 (x   ) =1.
Corollary A.1 Dene
b (z; )   px + 

1
2
z   

bz (; )  2  + px +   1 ()

1. If  < b (z; ) or z > bz (; ), then x    > 0.
2. If  = b (z; ) or z = bz (; ), then x    = 0.
3. If  > b (z; ) or z < bz (; ), then x    < 0.
Lemma A.5 Dene
e ()   12 1px +   1 () + z

 x +
1
2

x + 
r
x + 
x
 1 ()

We have:
1.       12 1px+ 
 1 () > 0 if  < e ().
2.       12 1px+ 
 1 () = 0 if  = e ().
3.       12 1px+ 
 1 () < 0 if  > e ().
Lemma A.6 The derivative of the regime change threshold with respect to  is given by
d
d
=  
z 

1=2
x



1=2
x (x
   )

1  z 

1=2
x



1=2
x (x   )
 < 0
Lemma A.7 Consider  () and e (). We have:
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1.  () > e () if  < 12 ,  () = e () if  = 12 , and  () < e () if  > 12 .
2. @
@
[ ()  e ()] < 0 for all  2 (0; 1).
3. lim!0 ( ()  e ()) =1 and lim!1 ( ()  e ()) =  1.
Lemma A.8 Consider d=dx. Then
d
dx
=   

3=2
x
(   )  1px+ 
 1 ()
1
( 1( 1z ))
1
z
  

1=2
x
Moreover,
1. If  < b then @@x > 0.
2. If  = b then @@x = 0.
3. If  > b then @@x < 0,
where b  z r xx +   1 ()

  1p
x + 
 1 ()
Lemma A.9 Consider d=d. Then
d
d
=  
1

1=2
x
(   )  12 11=2x
1p
x+
 1 ()
1
( 1( 1z ))
1
z
  

1=2
x
Moreover,
1. If  < e then @@ > 0.
2. If  = e then @@ = 0.
3. If  > e then @@ < 0,
where e  
 
 
r
 + 

1
2
 + 
 + 
 1 (T )
!
  1
2
1p
 + 
 1 (T )
B Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of uniqueness in the case n <1, for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng is standard and
consists of two steps. In the rst step I show that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in monotone
strategies (or threshold strategies). Next, it can be shown (using iterative deletion of strictly dominated
strategies) that there exist no other equilibria. The proof of the uniqueness result when n ! 1 for all
n 2 f1; :::; Ng is more technically involved than usual, on account of the presence of multiple types of agents.
This is because with N types of agents and the indi¤erence conditions, we have to make sure that the whole
system converges as n !1.
Note rst that the posterior belief of agent i, who observed signal xi, is given by
Pr

 < bxi = x = Prxi   s(i)"i < bxi = x = 1  Fs(i) x  b

 1=2
s(i)
!
38
Therefore, agent is posterior density of jxi is fs(i)


1=2
s(i) (xi   )

. Note that a higher x shifts agent is
posterior belief upwards according to the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering.
Let b be a candidate equilibrium regime change threshold such that the regime changes if and only if
  b. I rst show that for each b there exists a unique signal thresholds xn for each type sn, n = 1; :::; N such
that agent of type sn will attack the regime if and only if he observes a signal smaller than or equal to xn.
To this end, consider agent i. If agent i expects the regime to change if and only if   b, then the expected
payo¤ di¤erential between attacking he regime and not attacking it is given by
bZ
 1
Hs(i) (;  ) 
1=2
s(i)fs(i)
 
xi   

 1=2
s(i)
!
d +
1Z
b
Ls(i) (;  ) 
1=2
s(i)fs(i)
 
xi   

 1=2
s(i)
!
d
I now show that the expected payo¤ di¤erential is strictly increasing in xi. For this purpose, it is useful to
perform a change of variables by dening z = 1=2s(i) (xi   ) in the expression for the expected payo¤ di¤erential
so that the expected payo¤ di¤erential can be written as
1Z

1=2
s(i)(xi b)
Hs(i)

xi    1=2s(i) z; 

fs(i) (z) dz +

1=2
s(i)

xs(i) bZ
 1
Ls(i)

xs(i)    1=2s(i) z; 

fs(i) (z) dz
Di¤erentiating with respect to xi, we get
 Hs(i) (; ) 1=2s(i)fs(i)
 
xi   

 1=2
s(i)
!
+ Ls(i) (; ) 1=2s(i)fs(i)
 
xi   

 1=2
s(i)
!
+
1Z

1=2
s(i)(xi b)
@Hs(i)

xi    1=2s(i) z; 

@xi
fs(i) (z) dz
| {z }
<0
+

1=2
s(i)

xs(i) bZ
 1
@Ls(i)

xs(i)    1=2s(i) z; 

@xi
fs(i) (z) dz
| {z }
<0
Since Hs(i) > 0, Ls(i) < 0, and both Hs(i) and Ls(i) are non-increasing in , we conclude that the expected
payo¤ di¤erence is a decreasing function of xi. It is straightforward to see that for xi ! 1 the payo¤
di¤erential between the regime and not attacking it is strictly positive and that for xi !  1 it is strictly
negative. Thus, we conclude that there exists a unique signal value, call it xi , such that agent i will attack
the regime if and only if xi  xi . Since all agents of the same type are ex-ante symmetric, it follows that
for every n 2 f1; :::; Ng all agents of type sn, use the same threshold, which I denote by xn and which is the
unique solution to
1Z

1=2
n (xn b)
Hn

xn    1=2n z; 

fn (z) dz +

1=2
n (xn b)Z
 1
Ln

xn    1=2n z; 

fn (z) dz = 0; (7)
which is often referred to as the payo¤ indi¤erence equation.
Note that the above equation implicitly denes xn as a function of b. Since the derivative of the LHS of
the above equation with respect to b is given by
Hn
b;  1=2n fnxn   

 1=2
n

  Ln (; ) 1=2n fn

xn   

 1=2
n

> 0
it follows from the implicit function theorem that
@xn
@b 2 (0; 1)
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We saw that the payo¤ indi¤erence equation for type sn denes a function xn
b. It follows that at a
candidate equilibrium regime change threshold b the proportion of agents that attacks the regime is given by
NX
n=1
nFn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A
It follows that b is an equilibrium regime change threshold if and only if it is a solution to
R
0@b; NX
n=1
nFn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A ; 
1A = 0 (8)
By assumption, we know that the LHS of the above equation is strictly negative for all b <  and strictly
positive for b > . Moreover
@
@bR
0@b; NX
n=1
nFn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A ;  
1A
= R1  R2
24 NX
n=1
n
1=2
n fn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A0@@xn
b
@b   1
1A35 > 0
since R1 > 0, R2 < 0;and @xn
b =@b < 1. Therefore, we conclude that indeed there is a unique b (call it
) that solves Equation (8). Then  and fxn ()gNn=1 as dened by Equation (7) constitute the unique
equilibrium in monotone strategies.
To establish that there are no other equilibria, one can use the standard iterative deletion of dominated
strategies argument utilized in the literature on global games (see Morris and Shin (2004), for a particularly
careful exposition of this argument).
(Part 3) I consider now what happens as n ! 1 for each n = 1; :::; N . By Equation (7), it is easy
to see that limn!1 (x

n   ) = 0, n 2 f1; :::; Ng.35 Note that by Assumption 1 we have  2

; 

. Since
(xn   ) ! 0, there exists  > 0 and n < 1 such that for all n > n we have xn 2

   ;  + .
Let  = maxn=1;:::;N k. Then for all  >  the vector of equilibrium thresholds (; x1; :::; x

N ) 2

; 
 
   ;  +  ::::    ;  +   K, where K is a compact subset of RN+1.
Next, let  = (1; :::; N ), and consider a sequence f kg1k=1 such that along this sequence n ! 1 for
each n 2 f1; :::; Ng. Let f ( k) ; x1 ( k) ; :::; xN ( k)g1k=1 be the resulting sequence of thresholds. As shown
above, for all  k >   ( ; :::; ) we have f ( k) ; x1 ( k) ; :::; xN ( k)g 2 K where K is compact, and thus
f ( k) ; x1 ( k) ; :::; xN ( k)g1k=1 has a convergent subsequence where each element of this vector converges
to a nite limit. Call this subsequence

 kj
	1
j=1
.
Since f ( k) ; x1 ( k) ; :::; xN ( k)g has to be the solution to the N + 1 equilibrium conditions for each
 k we know that these thresholds satisfy payo¤ indi¤erence conditions. The payo¤ indi¤erence condition for
type sn can be written as
1Z
 1

1n
z2
h

1=2
n (xn );1
oHn xn    1=2n z; + 1nz2 1;1=2n (xn )oLn xn    1=2n z; 

fn (z) dz = 0
where the random variable
1n
z2
h

1=2
n (xn );1
oHn xn    1=2n z; + 1nz2 1;1=2n (xn )oLn xn    1=2n z; 
35This can be established by contradiction, that is, by supposing that jxk   j does not converge to 0 as
n !1 and showing that under this assumption Payo¤ Indi¤erence condition is violated for su¢ ciently high
values of n.
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is bounded (as both Hn and Ln are bounded). Thus, by the bounded convergence theorem we can pass the
limit as  kj !1 through the integral. Then the indi¤erence condition converges to
1Z
 1

1fz2[&n;1)gH
n (xn; ) + 1fz2( 1;&n)gL
n (xn; )

fn (z) dz = 0
where
&n  lim
kj
!1
1=2n (x

n   ) 2 R
Therefore,
Hn (xn; )
1Z
 1
1fz2[&n;1)gfn (z) dz + L
n (xn; )
1Z
 1
1fz2( 1;&n)gfn (z) dz = 0
We can write the above condition as
Hn (xn; ) [1  Fn (&n)] + Ln (xn; )Fn (&n) = 0
Rearranging, we get
Fn (&n) =
Hn (xn; )
Hk (xn; )  Ln (xn; )
Note that Fn (&n) is the proportion of the agents of type sn that attacks the regime as  kj !1. Denote
by 1 the limit of 
 as  kj ! 1, and recall that limkj!1 (x

n   ) = 0. Then 1 has to be the unique
solution to the regime change condition36
R
 
1;
NX
n=1
n
Hn (1; )
Hn (1; )  Ln (1; ) ; 
!
= 0
So far I have considered a particular convergent subsequence. However, note that the limit derived above is
independent of that convergent subsequence. Therefore,by Lemma A.1 we conclude that f (n) ; x1 (n) ; :::; xN (n)g
converges to the above limit. That is, in the limit as n !1 for all n = 1; :::; N we have the regime change
threshold  converging to the unique solution to
R
 
1;
NX
n=1
n
Hn (

1; )
Hn (

1; )  Ln (1; ) ; 
!
= 0
This completes the proof.
C Proofs for Section 3
In this section, I rst provide a proof of Theorem 1 where the decomposition of comparative statics into the
multiplier e¤ect and the direct e¤ect is obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to the system of
equilibrium conditions. I then show how this decomposition can be obtained using best-response dynamics.
Finally, I provide the proof of Proposition 2.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix the vector of parameters  = f 1; :::;  Mg2 RM , and let f ( ) ; x1 ( ) ; :::; xN ( )g
be the associated monotone equilibrium. The equilibrium thresholds have to satisfy the N indi¤erence equa-
36Otherwise, there would exist values of  kj such that 
   kj  would violate regime change condition.
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tions, which can be written succinctly as
P 1 ( ( ) ; x1 ( ) ; ) = 0
...
PN ( ( ) ; xN ( ) ; ) = 0
and the regime change condition, which can be written as37
R ( ( ) ; x1 ( ) ; :::; x

N ( ) ; ) = 0.
Next, using the above equilibrium equations, I derive the total e¤ect of a change in  m on the regime
change threshold. In what follows I will use @=@ m for the e¤ect of a change in  when the signal thresholds
fxn ( )gNn=1 are held constant, and d=d m for the total e¤ect that a change in  m has on , including its
e¤ect through adjustments in fxn ( )gNn=1. Similarly, I will use @=@xn for the direct e¤ect that a change in
xn has on 
 in the regime change condition. In a similar spirit, I dene @xn=@ m as the e¤ect of a change
in  m on x

n when agentsbeliefs about 
 are held constant, and @xn=@
 as the e¤ect of changing agents
beliefs about  on xn, n 2 f1; :::; Ng.
The key observation is that the equilibrium conditions written above are identities, as they dene implicitly
equilibrium thresholds as a function of  (see De la Fuente (2000)). Therefore, di¤erentiating the equilibrium
conditions with respect to  m we obtain
@P 1
@
d
d m
+
@P 1
@x1
dx1
d m
+
@P 1
@ m
= 0
...
@PN
@
d
d m
+
@PN
@xN
dxN
d m
+
@PN
@ m
= 0
and
@R
@
d
d m
+
NX
n=1
@R
@xn
dxn
d m
+
@R
@ m
= 0 (9)
Note that using the n-th indi¤erence condition (the n-th equation above) we can express dxn=d m as
dxn
d m
=   @P
n=@
@Pn=@xn
d
d m
  @P
n=@ m
@Pn=@xn
Then
@xn
@ m
=  @P
n=@ m
@Pn=@x1
and
@xn
@
=   @P
n=@
@Pn=@xn
as these derivatives capture the change in xn as a result of changes in  m and 
 in the n-th indi¤erence
equation. It follows that
dxn
d m
=
@xn
@
d
d m
+
@xn
@ m
37Note that the equilibrium regime change condition is given by
R
 
 ( ) ;
NX
n=1
nFn

x ( )   ( )

 1=2
n

; 
!
= 0
Thus, with a slight abuse notation we can write the above condition as
R ( ( ) ; x1 ( ) ; :::; x

N ( ) ; ) = 0
42
Substituting this into Equation (9), I obtain
@R
@
d
d m
+
NX
n=1
@R
@xn

@xn
@
d
d m
+
@xn
@ m

+
@R
@ m
= 0
Dividing both sides by @R=@ and rearranging, the above equation becomes"
1 
NX
n=1
@R=@xn
@R=@
@xn
@
#
d
d m
=  
NX
n=1
@R=@xn
@R=@
@xn
@ m
  @R=@ m
@R=@
Note that
@
@ m
=  @R=@ m
@R=@
and
@
@xn
=  @R=@x

n
@R=@
,
as these ratios of derivatives simply capture the e¤ects that changes in  m and x

n in the regime change
equilibrium condition have on . Thus, the above equation can be written as
d
d m
=
1
1 PNn=1 @@xn @xn@ 
"
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@ m
+
@
@ m
#
;
or
d
d m
=MD ( m)
as claimed.38
Next, I show that the multiplier e¤ect is always positive. Once this is established the fact that sgn (d=d m) =
sgn (D ( m)) follows immediately. To see thatM ( m) > 0, recall rst that, as shown in the proof of unique-
ness, we have @xn=@
 < 1. Moreover, since the equilibrium regime change condition is given by
R
 
;
NX
n=1
nFn

xn   

 1=2
n

; 
!
= 0;
it follows that
@
@xn
=
 R2n1=2n fn

xn 

 1=2
n

R1  R2PNk=1 k1=2k fk xk  1=2
k
 2 (0; 1) ;
since R1 > 0 and R2 < 0. Therefore
0 <
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@

NX
n=1
@
@xn
=
 R2PNn=1 n1=2n fn xn  1=2n 
R1  R2PNk=1 k1=2k fk xk  1=2
k
 < 1
This establishes thatM2 (1;1), thus providing proofs of parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 1.
Finally, suppose that n =  , for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng and consider what happens to the multiplier e¤ect as
 !1. From the expression for @=@xn, it is clear that
lim
!1
@
@xn
= 1; n = 1; :::; N
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 (Section B of this Appendix) that
@xn
@
=
 Hn (; ) 1=2fn

xn 
 1=2

+ Ln (; ) 1=2fn

xn 
 1=2

 Hn (; ) 1=2fn

xn 
 1=2

+ Ln (; ) 1=2fn

xn 
 1=2

+ n
;
where
n 
1Z
1=2(xn )
@Hn

xn    1=2z; 

@xn
fn (z) dz +
1=2(xn )Z
 1
@Ln

xn    1=2z; 

@xn
fn (z) dz < 0
38Below, I show that the above decomposition can also be derived using myopic best-response dynamics.
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In the proof of Proposition 1 I showed that 1=2 (xn   ) converges to a nite constant as  !1. Thus,
lim!1 n, is nite while
lim
!1

 Hn (; ) 1=2fn

xn   
 1=2

+ Ln (; ) 1=2fn

xn   
 1=2

= lim
!1
1=2fn

xn   
 1=2

[ Hn (; ) + Ln (; )]| {z }
<0
=  1
It follows that
lim
n!1
@xn
@
= 1,
implying that
@
@xn
@xn
@
! 1 as  !1
Thus, we conclude that
lim
n!1
M =1
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
C.2 Derivations Using Best-Response dynamics
Here, I show how one can derive the multiplier and direct e¤ects by considering best-response dynamics
following a change in model parameters. This approach leads to a more intuitive derivation of the multiplier
e¤ect.
Suppose that initially the vector of parameters is  . Given  , agents believe that the regime will collapse
if and only if    ( ), and each agent of type sn plans to attack the regime if and only if he receives a
signal lower than xn. Suppose that suddenly a parameter  m 2  increases. How do agents respond to this
change?
A small increase in  m has two e¤ects on the regime outcome. First, holding agentsbeliefs about 

constant, it leads to a change in the signal threshold used by type sn equal to @xn=@ m =  Pn m=Pnxn , for
each n. This in turn leads to a change in the regime change threshold equal to (@=@xn) (@x

n=@ m). Second,
it directly a¤ects the resilience of the status quo, and hence leads to a change in the regime threshold equal
to @=@ m =  R m=R . It follows that the change in  m leads to an initial change in  equal to
@
@ m
+
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@ m
;
which is exactly the direct e¤ect D ( m) identied above.
The above change in  initiates further adjustments to the new equilibrium. In response to a change in 
by D ( m), each agent adjust their threshold. This adjustment is approximately equal to (@xn=@)D ( m),
that is the product of sensitivity of xn to changes in 
 and the actual change in . This leads to an additional
change in  equal to
S1 
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@
D ( m) ,
where I am using S1 to denote the rst step of best-response dynamics initiated by the direct e¤ect. This
change in  equal to S1 induces a further change in agentsbeliefs about the regime outcome and hence to a
further adjustment. This process continues ad innitum, with the adjustment of  in the k-th round of this
process equal to
D ( m)
 
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@
!k
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The total change in  is then obtained by adding up the adjustments in  in all rounds (including the
initial response), hence (using the convention that S0  D ( m)) is given by:
d
d m
=
1X
k=1
Sk =
1
1 PNn=1 @@xn @xn@
"
@
@ m
+
NX
n=1
@
@xn
@xn
@ m
#
,
where the second equality is valid if Nn=1 (@
=@xn) (@x

n=@
) < 1 (which is always the case when there is a
unique equilibrium). Thus, we obtain the result as stated in Theorem 1. However, the above derivations have
the advantage that they make it clear that the multiplier e¤ect captures the adjustment in  driven by the
adjustment in agentsbeliefs about the regime change threshold.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. The planners problem is given by
min
fvkgNn=1
NX
n=1
nvn
s:t:  (v1; :::; vN )  b
vk 2 [0; v] , n = 1; :::; N
The Lagrangian associated with the above problem is given by
L =  
NX
n=1
nvn + 
h
 b +  (v1; :::; vN )i+ NX
n=1
nvn +
NX
n=1
%n [v   vn] ;
where I wrote a Lagrangian for maximization of  Nn=1nvn subject to the above constraints. The rst-order
conditions are
 1 +  d
 (v1; :::; vN )
dv1
+ 1   %1 = 0
...
 N +  d
 (v1; :::; vN )
dvN
+ N   %N = 0,
where as before I denote by d=dvn the total change of  with respect to vn. Now, from Theorem 1 we know
that
d (v1; :::; vN )
dvn
=MD (vn)
Therefore, the above system of equation can be written as
 1 +  [M D (v1;v)] + 1   %1 = 0
...
 N +  [M D (vN ;v)] + N   %N = 0,
Let v = fv1 ; :::; vNg denote the vector of optimal subsidies and suppose that vn < v and vn+1 > 0. In
that case %n = 0 (as v

n < v) and n+1 = 0 (as v

n > 0). Since v

n and v

n+1 are optimal it follows that
 1 + 

M D (vn;v)
n

+
n
n
= 0
 1 + 

M D (vn+1;v)
n+1

  %n+1
n+1
= 0
Since n, %n+1 > 0, it follows that
 1 + 

M D (vn;v)
n

<  1 + 

M D (vn+1;v)
n+1

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Since  > 0, the above inequality implies that
D (vn;v)
n
<
D (vn+1;v)
n+1
;
which is a contradiction. It follows that the planner always targets the types of agents who have the highest
direct e¤ect adjusted by the size of the group.
Despite the fact that the above condition suggests that the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the
measures of the types, the optimal subsidy scheme is not a¤ected by the values of the 0ns. This is because
D (vn;v) = @

@xn
@xn
@vk
where @xn=@vn only depends on 
0
ns indirectly via 
 (as this e¤ect is the same for all types of agents) while
@
@xn
/ k
Therefore, ns cancel out when we compute the direct e¤ect.
D Proofs for Section 4
D.1 Publicity Multiplier
Proof of Proposition 3. This is simply a corollary of Theorem 1. In particular, from the proof of Theorem
1 we know that for any parameter  m,
dx
d m
=
@x
@ m
+
@x
@
d
d m
Then using the expression for d=d m derived above and setting @
=@ m = 0, we have
dx
d m
@x
@ m
=
@x
@ m
+ @x

@
@
@x
@x
@ m
1  @
@x
@x
@
@x
@ m
=
1
1  @
@x
@x
@
=M
In Section 4:1 I restricted my attention to parameters of the model that a¤ect only the payo¤ indi¤erence
condition. I also considered the setup with a single type of agent, to make the model closely comparable to
the setup considered by Morris and Shin (2003). The next result provides the decomposition of dx=d m into
the multiplier e¤ect and the partial e¤ectwhen both of these assumptions are relaxed, that is, when there
are N distinct types of players and  m may a¤ect payo¤ di¤erential functions fngNn=1 as well as the regime
change function.
Proposition D.1 Fix  , and consider the e¤ect of that changing  m has on x

n. Then
dxn
d m
=M
24 @xn
@ m
+
@xn
@
@
@ m
+
X
k 6=n
@xn
@
@
@xk

@xk
@ m
  @x

n
@ m
35
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1 we know that
dxn
d m
=
@xn
@ m
+
@xn
@
d
d m
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Using the fact that d=d m =MD ( m) and the denition of D ( m) we get
dxn
d m
=
@xn
@ m
+
@xn
@
M
"
@
@ m
+
NX
k=1
@
@xk
@xk
@ m
#
=
@xn
@ m

1 M@x

n
@
@
@xn

+
@xn
@
M
24 @
@ m
+
X
k 6=n
@
@xk
@xk
@ m
35
=
@xn
@ m
241 Pk 6=n @@xk @xk@
1 PNk=1 @@x
k
@x
k
@
35+ @xn
@
M
24 @
@ m
+
X
k 6=n
@
@xk
@xk
@ m
35
= M
24 @xn
@ m
+
@xn
@
@
@ m
+
@xn
@
X
k 6=n
@
@xk

@xk
@ m
  @x

n
@ m
35
The above decomposition is intuitive. The direct e¤ect consists of the e¤ect that a change in  m has
on xn through its e¤ect on the regime change condition (as captured by (@x

n=@
) (@=@ m)), and through
its e¤ect on the payo¤ indi¤erence condition (as captured by @xn=@ m). But note that a change in  m
also a¤ects the payo¤ indi¤erence conditions of other types of agents. Since the multiplier e¤ect captures how
changes in fxkgNk=1, through their e¤ects on , lead to further changes in xn, we need to take into account the
fact that types of agents di¤erent than type sn may adjust their thresholds by di¤erent amounts in response
to a change in  m. The last term in the square brackets is thus simply an adjustment for this heterogeneity
in the initial response of agents to the change in  m.
D.2 Relation to Strategic Complementarities
Proof of Proposition 4. (Part 1) Let x = fx1; :::; xNg, where xn is the threshold used by agents of type
sn, and let  (x) be the implied regime change threshold. To establish the rst part of the Proposition it
su¢ ces to show that
NX
n=1
wnr1n (x) =
NX
n=1
@ (x)
@xn
@xn
@
Note that
NX
n=1
wnr1n (x) =
NX
n=1
wn
 
NX
k=1
@n (x
)
@xk
!
=
NX
n=1
wn
 
NX
k=1
@n (x
)
@
@ (x)
@xk
!
where we used the observation that xk a¤ects n (x
) only indirectly, through its e¤ect on . But then
NX
n=1
wn
@n (x
)
@
=
 
NX
k=1
@ (x)
@xk
!
NX
n=1
@(x)
@xnPN
l=1
@(x)
@x
l
@n (x
)
@
=
NX
n=1
@ (x)
@xn
@n (x
)
@
=
NX
n=1
@ (x)
@xn
@xn
@
since in equilibrium xn = n (x
).
(Part 2) Without loss of generality, let us focus on an of type sn whose indi¤erence condition isZ (x)
 1
Hn (; ) fn (jn (x)) d +
Z 1
(x)
Ln (; ) fn (jn (x)) d = 0
In the proof of Proposition 1, I showed that as long as n <1; we have
@n (x
)
@
< 1 and
NX
k=1
@
@xk
< 1
It follows that
r1n (x) =
NX
k=1
@n (x
)
@
@ (x)
@xk
=
@n (x
)
@
NX
k=1
@ (x)
@xk
<
@n (x
)
@
< 1
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In the proof of the Proposition 1, I also showed that
lim
n!1
@n (x
)
@
! 1,
and that if n =  for all n 2 f1; :::; Ng then
lim
!1
NX
k=1
@ (x)
@xk
= 1
Therefore,
lim
!1
r1n (x) = 1
This establishes Part 2 of Proposition 4.
D.3 Strategic Complementarities Under the Complete Information
In this section, I show that strategic complementarities in the complete information model and in the global
game model in the limit as x !1 are equally strong. For simplicity, I assume that N = 1, so that there is
a single type of agent.
Consider rst the complete information version of the model described in Section 2. In this case I let
xi = , so that the private signals reveal the truth, that is the information structure is complete. I restrict
attention to monotone strategies of the form attack the status quo if xi  bxi, and refrain from attacking the
status quo if xi > bxi. Now, suppose that all agents use the same threshold bx, and let CIi (bx) denote the
optimal threshold of agent i when faced with such a strategy prole. It is easy to see that the best-response
function of agent i is to choose CIi (bx) = bx if bx 2 ; , CIi (bx) =  if bx  , as the status quo collapses even
for all   , and CIi (bx) =  if bx   as the status quo always survives for all   . These observations are
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma D.1 When the information structure is complete, the best-response function of each agent i is given
by
CIi (bx) =
8><>:
 if bx  bx if bx 2 ; 
 if bx >  and
@CIi (bx)
@bx =
8><>:
0 if bx  
1 if bx 2 ; 
0 if bx > 
Next, consider the global game model, that is, the model described in Section 2, but set N = 1 and denote
by  the common precision level of the private signals.39 Let bx denote the threshold used by all agents, and
denote by i (bx) the threshold used by all the agent i in response. We have the following result.
Lemma D.2 Suppose that  !1. Then
lim
!1
i (bx) =
8><>:
 if bx  bx if bx 2 ; 
 if bx >  and lim!1
@i (bx)
@bx =
8><>:
0 if bx  
1 if bx 2 ; 
0 if bx > 
Proof. Let bx be the thresholds used by all agents and b (bx) be the implied regime change threshold. I want
to compute i (bx) and @i (bx) =@bx.
Suppose rst that all agents use threshold bx < . In this case it is easy to show that lim!1 b (bx) = .
As the consequence, it has to to be the case that lim!1 i (bx) =  . To see that, consider agent is
indi¤erence condition and note that if lim!1 i (bx) >  then the LHS of the indi¤erence condition converges
39As there is only one type of agent, I drop the subscript n everywhere.
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to H (lim!1 i (bx) ; ) > H (; ) > 0, which would mean that for su¢ ciently high  the payo¤ indi¤erence
condition is violated. Similarly, if lim!1 i (bx) <  then the LHS of the indi¤erence condition converges to
L (; ) < 0, which would again mean that for su¢ ciently high  the payo¤ indi¤erence condition is violated.
Thus, lim!1  (bx) = .40 An analogous argument establishes that lim!1 i (bx) =  when bx > .
Next, consider bx 2 ; . First, I establish that if bx 2 ; , then b (bx) ! bx as  ! 1. To see that this
is the case, recall that the regime change equilibrium condition is given by
R
 b; F  bx  b
 1=2
!
; 
!
= 0
It follows that as  !1 the LHS of the above equation converges to R
b; 1;  < 0 for all b 2 [; bx), and to
R
b; 0;  > 1 for all b 2 [; bx). Thus, the only candidate limit is bx. To see that lim!1 b (bx) exists, note
that b (bx; x) 2 ; , which is a compact subset of R, and apply Lemma A.1. It follows that lim!1 b (bx) = bx
and that
F
 bx  b
 1=2
!
! m (bx) ;
where m (bx) is dened as the solution to
R (bx;m (bx) ; ) = 0
Next, consider i (bx). From the denition of i (bx) as the solution to the indi¤erence equation it is clear
that i (bx) can be written as i b (bx) since agent is indi¤erence equation depends on bx only indirectly
through b. Using the same argument as above, we have lim!1 i b (bx) = b (bx) for all bx 2 ; . But then
it follows that
 (bx) = bx for all bx 2 ; 
It remains to show that @i (bx) =@bx ! 1 as  ! 1 for all bx 2 ; . This cannot be concluded directly
from the fact that lim!1  (bx) = bx for all bx 2 ;  since in general
lim
!1
@i (bx)
@bx 6= @@bx h lim!1i (bx)i
However, as argued above, i (bx) = i b (bx) and as shown in the proof of Proposition 1
lim
!1
@
b (bx)
@b = 1
Furthermore,
lim
!1
@b (bx)
@bx = lim!1  R2
1=2f
 bx b

 1=2
x

R1  R21=2f
 bx b

 1=2
x
 = 1
This establishes the claim.
The above lemmas establish that the best-response function in the global game model with one type of
agent converges to the best-response function of the complete information model as  !1. Nevertheless, the
global game model has a unique equilibrium, while the complete information model has multiple equilibria.
As explained in the paper, the reason behind this is that the agents in the global game model face strategic
uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the behavior of others, which is absent under complete information.
40To establish that lim!1 i (bx) exists one can follow the same argument as used in the proof of Proposition
1 (Section B of this Appendix) to show that the equilibrium thresholds converge when the noise in the signals
is vanishingly small. In the interest of space, I omit this step.
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E Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma A.3, we know that in the simple framework of Section 4:2 the multiplier
e¤ect is given by
M = 1
1  +x
x
z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )

1+z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x )

Note thatM is high when 


1=2
x (x
   )

is high, and tends to 1 (its minimum value) as 


1=2
x (x
   )

!
0. Since  () is a symmetric function that achieves it maximum at 0, it follows thatM is a decreasing function
of jx   j. Therefore, to understand how a change in , , or z a¤ectsM it is enough to understand how
a change in these parameters a¤ects jx   j. Furthermore, by Lemma A.2
x    = 
x
(   ) 
p
x + 
x
 1 ()
To establish how changes in parameters a¤ect the distance between x and , suppose that x    = a,
where a 2 R. From the expression for x   , we know that x    = a if and only if
 =  +
x

a+
p
x + 

 1 ()
Next, note that  takes such a value if and only if  +
x

a +
p
x+

 1 () is the solution to the regime
change condition. Since (as established in Lemma A.2) the regime change condition is given by
 = z



1=2
x
(   ) 
r
x + 
x
 1 ()

,
we know that this happens if and only if
 +
p
x + 

 1 () = z

1=2x a

  x

a
Subtracting from (1=2) z both sides, we obtain
  
1
2
z +
p
x + 

 1 () = z

1=2x a

  1
2
z   x

a (10)
Note that the RHSof Equation (10) is equal to 0 at a = 0, and that its derivative is given by
z1=2x 

1=2x a

  x

 z1=2x 1p
2
  x

= 1=2x
"
z
1p
2
  
1=2
x

#
< 0;
where the last inequality holds as long as the equilibrium is unique (which is the maintained assumption in
Section 5.2). It follows that the RHS of Equation (10) is strictly decreasing in a.
From the above observations, it follows that whenever   12z+
p
x+

 1 () = 0, then a = 0, meaning
that x    = 0, so that the multiplier e¤ect achieves its maximum value (for given value of  and x).
Moreover, by applying the implicit function theorem to Equation (10), it is easy to see that da=d < 0,
da=d < 0 and da=dz > 0. It follows that a decreases as    12z +
p
x+

 1 () increases. Thus, we
conclude that Equation (10) implies a one-to-one mapping between    12z+
p
x+

 1

1+r
1+R

and a, with
a higher    12z+
p
x+

 1

1+r
1+R

implying a lower a, and a = 0 when    12z+
p
x+

 1

1+r
1+R

= 0.
It follows that if we dene
g (; ; ) =
   12z +
p
x + 

 1 ()
 ,
then a higher value of g (; ; ) indicates a larger distance between x
 and , that is, a higher value of
jx   j. This proves the result.
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Proof of Proposition 6. To understand how the multiplier e¤ect varies with x, it su¢ ces to determine
how a change in x a¤ects
 + x
x
z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x
   )

1 + z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x   )

The derivative of the above expression with respect to x is proportional to

(x + )
+
1
2
  x (x   )
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First, note that if we set  = 0, the above expression is positive, since in this case (x   ) =   1

1=2
x
 1 ().
It follows that when the prior is uninformative, the multiplier e¤ect is always increasing in x.
Next, note that 1=2x = (x + ) converges to 0 as x !1. Moreover,
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It follows that
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> 0
Thus, for su¢ ciently high x the multiplier e¤ect is necessarily increasing in x.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof of this result can be found in the Online Appendix. Here, I briey
explain the approach used to prove this result.
To understand howM varies with , we need to show how
 + x
x
z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x
   )

1 + z
1=2
x 


1=2
x (x   )

varies with . This is a challenging task, since a change in  a¤ects the above expression both directly and
indirectly (via its e¤ect on x and ) and the resulting derivative is a complex object. The approach I take
below is nevertheless straightforward if tedious. I rst compute and simplify the derivative of the above object
with respect to . I then show that (for any parameters of the model) (1) the resulting expression is negative
as  ! 1; (2) there exists a non-empty closed interval I of  on which this expression is positive; and
(3) as  increases, the resulting expression crosses the 0 line from below when  < min fIg and from above
when  > min fIg. The Proposition follows from these observations.
Proof of Corollary 2. Note that in Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011);  = (1 + r) = (1 +R). The result then
follows from Propositions 5 and 6.
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F Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Corollary 3. Note that
D ( m) =  
@R

;m

;fxngNn=1

; 

@ m
@R

;m

;fxngNn=1

; 

@
+
NX
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
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
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
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
;m

;fxngNn=1

; 

@
@Pn(;xn; )
@ m
@Pn(;xn; )
@xn
Note rst that, given the assumed information structure, when player i receives a higher signal xi, he
expects a higher value of  on average. In other words, a higher xi shifts his posterior belief upward according
to the rst-order stochastic dominance ordering (see Section B of this Appendix). Therefore, it follows
that a higher xi always decreases agent is incentives to attack the regime. Now, if we write agent is
indi¤erence condition as Ps(i) (
; x; ) = 0, it follows that @Ps(i)
 
; xs(i); 

=@xs(i) < 0. Next, suppose
that an increase in  m always increases the payo¤ di¤erential between attacking and not attacking, that is,
@s(i) (; ) =@ m  0 for all . In this case, it is immediate that @Ps(i)
 
; xs(i); 

=@ m  0 so that
@xs(i)
@ m
=   @Ps(i)
 
; xs(i); 

=@ m
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
; xs(i); 

=@xs(i)
 0;
and that @xs(i)=@ m  0 does not depend on the assumed distribution of signal noise Fs(i).
Next, consider the direct e¤ect of a change in  m that operates through the regime change function
R
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;m
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; fxngNn=1

;  

, where m

; fxngNn=1

=
PN
n=1 nFn


1=2
n (x

n   )

. Note that a higher
 always decreases the proportion of agents attacking the regime when fxngNn=1 is held constant. Since
R1 > 0 by assumption, it follows that @R

;m

; fxngNn=1

;  

=@  0. Therefore, it follows that if
@R (;m; ) =@ m  0, then
@
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
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
;  

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Again sgn (@=@ m) does not depend on the assumed fFngNn=1.
Finally, we always have @=@xn > 0, n = 1; :::; N , as higher signal thresholds imply a higher proportion
of agents attacking the regime for a given  regardless of fFngNn=1. Thus, we conclude that D ( m)  0, and
its signs does not depend on the particular noise structure as characterized by fFngNn=1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that Hn () = Hn > 0 and Ln () = Ln < 0. It is easy to show that in
monotone equilibrium, a player of type sn uses the threshold xn that solves
HnFn

xn   

 1=2
n

+ Ln

1  Fn

xn   

 1=2
n

= 0
Therefore, the proportion of agents of type sn that attacks the regime is given by
n Pr (xi  xnj) = nFn

xn   

 1=2
n

= n
 Ln
Hn   Ln 2 (0; n)
It follows that the total mass of agents attacking the regime in equilibrium is given by
m () =
NX
n=1
n
 Ln
Hn   Ln 2 (0; 1)
The key observation here is that the proportion of agents that attack the regime at  =  does not depends
on the assumed information structure fFngNn=1. But then it follows that the unique equilibrium threshold ,
which is determined by
R (;m () ; ) = 0
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also does not depend on fFngNn=1. As such, the comparative statics are unchanged when the information struc-
ture changes. Moreover, note that this robustness result holds without the need for additional restrictions
on the regime change function R that were needed in Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 4. This results follows immediately from the denitions of  ( ) and  ( ) and
the fact that (as discussed in the proof of Corollary 3) we have d=d m > 0 when @R=@ m > (<) 0 and
@n=@ m  () 0 for all  and m.
F.1 Predictions that Depend on the Information Structure: Examples
In this section, I provide two examples to show how the comparative statics depend on information structure
when the hypothesis of Corollary 3 is not satised. In the rst example, which is based on Morris and Shin
(1998), whether a change in  m increases or decreases the resilience of the regime depends on the mass of
agents that attack the regime (i.e., the sign of @R=@ m depends on m). In the second example, which is based
on Szkup (2016), a change in  m tends to decrease the resilience of the regime (i.e., @R=@ m < 0), but at the
same time it also decreases agentsincentives to attack the regime (@n=@ m > 0).
In both cases, I compare comparative statics predictions derived under two distinct information structures.
Under the rst information structure, agents have the prior belief that   unif [   ;  + ], and each of
them receives a private signal xi =  + "i, with "i  unif [ "; "].41 I refer to this information structure as
uniform-uniform.Under the second information structure, agents have the prior belief that   N  ;  1 ,
and each of them receives a private signal xi =  + "i, with "i  N

0; 
 1=2
x

. I refer to this information
structure as normal-normal.
F.2 Example 1: Non-monotone Regime Change Function
Consider the following example adapted from Morris and Shin (1998). Suppose for simplicity that the payo¤s
to speculators from attacking the regime are 1  t if an attack is successful and  t if an attack is unsuccessful,
while choosing not to attack yields 0. The central bank will keep the peg if
   c (m;L) > 0
and abandon it otherwise. Here,  stands for the benet of keeping the peg, m is the fraction of speculators
that attacks the peg, and L is the amount of foreign reserves that the central bank can raise quickly in order
to prevent the attack. Finally, c (m;L) is the cost of defending the regime when the size of attack is m and
the foreign reserves are L, with cm > 0.
Assume that cL (m;L) < 0 for m < m, and cL (m;L) = 0 if m = m; and cL (m;L) > 0 if m > m, so
that raising additional liquidity to prevent the attack decreases the cost of defending the peg if and only if
m is relatively low. These assumptions capture the idea that when the attack is expected to be small, the
central bank can borrow foreign reserves from other foreign central banks cheaply (since the loans are almost
risk-free). On the other hand, if the attack is large, then raising additional foreign reserves is costly, as other
banks expect that the peg will collapse and results in an economic crisis, in which case they are unlikely to
recover their loans. As such ,other central banks will charge a high interest rate on those loans.
Let  denote the threshold level of  such that the peg is abandoned if and only if  < . We then have
the following result.42
41 Implicitly, I assume that  is large enough so that   <  2" and + > +2" (i.e.,

   2";  + 2" 
(   ;  + )), which is required for the equilibrium to be unique.
42The proof of this result can be found in the Online Appendix.
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Lemma F.1 Consider the e¤ects that changes in  and L have on 
 (i.e., d=d and d
=dL).
1. Under the uniform-uniform information structure:
(a) d

d
= 0, that is, a change in  has no e¤ect on 

(b) d

dL
< 0 if and only if 1  t < m.
2. Under the normal-normal information structure:
(a) d

d
< 0, that is a higher  always decreases 
.
(b) d

dL
< 0 if and only if
 +
p
x + 

 1 (t) +
p
x

 1 (m)  c (m;L)
Thus, we see that predictions of the model di¤er substantially under the two information structures
considered. When the prior and the noise in the signals have uniform distributions, changes in the mean of
the prior have no e¤ect on , while an increase in L decrease the probability of a currency crisis if and only
if the transaction cost t is su¢ ciently high. On the other hand, when the prior and the noise in the signals
have normal distribution, an increase in the mean of the prior always leads to a decrease in the currency crisis
threshold. Furthermore, whether an increase in L decreases or increases  depends on all the parameters of
the model
F.2.1 Example 2: Counteracting E¤ects of an Increase in  m
In this example, I consider a case where an increase in  m negatively a¤ects the regimes resistance but also
discourages the agents from attacking the regime. As before, I consider the uniform-uniform and normal-
normal information structures. As
There is a single rm and a continuum of investors indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]. The rm owns a risky project
with a return of  and with total liquidation value 1. The project can be partially liquidated to meet early
withdrawals if such a need arises. The rm nanced its project by issuing an amount  of short-term debt with
face value 1 and (1  ) of long-term debt with face value DL, with  2 [0; 1]. Before the project matures,
the short-term debt holders have to decide whether to roll over their debt or withdraw their funds early.
Short-term debt holders who withdraw their funds early get their funds back, that is their are paid back
1 unit of funds. Short-term debt holders who roll over their loans are promised DS > 1 if the rms return
from the project exceeds its debt obligation. Otherwise, the rm defaults and all the debt-holders receive
nothing.43 It follows that short-term debt holders face the following payo¤s:
Repayment Default
Roll over DS 0
Withdraw 1 1
Let m denote the fraction of short-term debt holders that withdraw their funds early. The rm repays its
debt if and only if
 (1 m)   (1 m)DS   (1  )DL > 0
Here  (1 m) is the return from the scaled-down investment, where a fraction m of the investment was
liquidated to meet early withdrawals. In this setting, attacking the regime is associated with withdrawing
funds early.
43This is a substantially simplied version of the model in Szkup (2016), which abstracts from issues of early
default, the optimal choice of maturity structure, and the optimal choice of face values of debt.
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Fix the vector of the parameters of the model  . Let  ( ) denote the default threshold such that the
rm repays its debt if and only if    ( ), and let m () denote the proportion of agents withdrawing early
when  =  ( ). 44 Now, suppose that the rm would like to avoid early withdrawals and considers increasing
DS in order to discourage investors from withdrawing their loans early. The next result characterizes the e¤ect
of increasing DS on  under the two information structures. The proof of this result can be found in the
Online Appendix.
Lemma F.2 Consider the e¤ect of changing DS on the equilibrium default threshold.
1. Under the uniform-uniform information structure, we have d

dDS
 0 if and only if
  min

DL  D2S
DL + 1  2DS ; 0

2. Under the normal-normal information structure, we have d

dDS
< 0 if and only if
 < b ( )
where b ( ) is the value of  that is the unique solution to
  (1 m ( ( )))  ( ( ) DS) @m
 ( ( ))
@DS
= 0.45
We see that under the uniform-uniform information structure, whether DS decreases or increases depends
on , DL, and DS but not on the parameters that a¤ect the information structure. On the other hand, under
the normal-normal information structure, all parameters of the model (including the precision of the private
signal, the precision of the prior, and the mean of the prior) matter through their impact on b.
G Proofs for Section 7
Proof of Proposition 8. This result follows from Theorem 1 and the denition of the directional derivative.
More precisely, the e¤ect of a simultaneous small change in each  m1 ; :::;  mK on 
 is captured by the
directional derivative of 
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

in the direction 1 = (1; :::; 1) 2 RK and is given by
r1
 
 m1 ; :::;  mK

=
KX
k=1
d
d mk
=M
KX
k=1
D ( k)
This establishes the result.
To prove Proposition 9, I need the following result. Its proof can be found in the Online Appendix.
Lemma G.1 The monotone equilibrium characterized by the regime change threshold b is stable if and only
if 9" > 0 such that
R
0@b; NX
n=1
nFn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A ; 
1A
is increasing for all b 2 b   ";b + ".
44 It can be shown that the default threshold s is unique as long as

1=2
x

>
 (DL  DS)
(1  )
1p
2
I assume that this condition is satised.
45Since  2  , a change in  a¤ects this condition via its impact on ( ).
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With this result in hand, I provide the proof of Proposition 9:
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider a monotone equilibrium with associated regime change b. Thenthe
decomposition of a change in b into the mutliplier and direct e¤ects can be derived by applying the implicit
function theorem in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Next, I show that the multiplier e¤ect associated with b is positive if and only if the equilibrium is stable.
Recall that the multiplier e¤ect is dened as
M = 1
1 PNn=1 @b@xn @xn@b ;
where b solves
R
0@b; NX
n=1
nFn
0@xn
b  b

 1=2
n
1A ; 
1A = 0
and
n
xn
boN
n=1
are the unique solutions to the indi¤erence conditions when agents believe that the regime
change threshold will collapse if and only if   b. The multiplier e¤ect M 2 (1;1) if and only ifPN
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b < 1. But note that
NX
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b =  
R2
PN
n=1 n
1=2
n fn

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
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R1  R2PNn=1 n1=2n fnxn(b) b 1=2n
 ;
where the numerator and the denominator are always positive (since R2 < 0 and @xn=@b > 0). Thus,PN
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b < 1 if and only if
R1 +R2
NX
n=1
n
1=2
n fn
 
xn   b

 1=2
n
!
@xn
@b   1

> 0
However, by Lemma G.1, we see that this condition is the same as the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a monotone equilibrium to be stable. Thus,
PN
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b < 1 (so that M 2 (1;1)) if and if b is
associated with a stable equilibrium. By the same argument it follows that when equilibrium is unstable we
have
PN
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b > 1, and henceM < 0.
By the above argument, it follows that for a stable equilibrium we have sgn

db=d m = sgn (D ( m)),
while if b is associated with an unstable equilibrium then sgndb=d m =  sgn (D ( m)).
Finally, consider the best-response dynamics following a change in  m. Note that the derivations of
db=d m using best-response dynamics presented in Section C.2 are also valid even if there are multiple
equilibria regardless, whether b is associated with a stable or an unstable equilibrium. In either case
db
d m
=
1X
k=0
D ( m)
"
NX
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b
#k
In light of the above discussion, if the equilibrium is stable then @
b
@xn
@xn
@b 2 (0; 1), and hence the best-response
dynamics converge. On the other hand, if the equilibrium is unstable, then, as was shown above, we havePN
n=1
@b
@xn
@xn
@b > 1, and hence the best-response dynamics diverge. This completes the proof.
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